Tuesday, July 22, 2014

US hospital to pay $190m for filming patients

Beware of the doctor who has anything more than a stethoscope around his neck. Perhaps even that or a pen peeping prominently out of his shirt or jacket pocket.

Illustrative of the growing possibilities that technology particularly miniaturization of electronics provides for predatory sexual behavior, a top US hospital has agreed to pay $190 million to settle claims from thousands of women who may have been surreptitiously recorded during pelvic exams by a gynecologist who committed suicide subsequent to the expose.

The case centers on Dr Nikita Levy, a prominent and popular ob-gyn for 25 years at the Johns Hopkins Community Medicine system in Baltimore, who reportedly used a camera pen strung around his neck to secretly record women for years during examinations. A female colleague who got suspicious of his behavior eventually brought it to the notice of authorities.

Investigators confronted Dr Levy found more than 1,300 videos and images during searches of Levy's home and office, most of them recorded through pen cameras and key fobs, leading to his firing in February 2013. Ten days later, he committed suicide after writing an apology note to his wife and three children.

Hopkins has been dealing with the fall-out ever since, and on Monday, the hospital announced that it would pay $190 million one of the largest settlements involving sexual misconduct by a physician to settle the case.

More than 7,000 women are expected to receive compensation from the settlement. Although Levy examined more than 12,000 women during his career at Hopkins, he began his recording them only in 2005.

The women could not be identified from the images, which were mostly of genitalia, but attorneys involved in the case said all former patients could be considered victims because of the feeling of betrayal and trauma they felt by the invasion of doctor-patient confidentiality. Each plaintiff is expected to be evaluated by a team of professionals, including a psychiatrist, and placed into one of four categories, based on the degree to which they were affected.

"Many of our clients still feel a betrayal and lack of trust and have fallen out of the medical system," Jonathan Schochor, the lead attorney for the patients in the class-action lawsuit, told the Baltimore Sun. "They stopped seeing their doctors, they stopped taking their children to doctors. They refused to see male ob-gyns, or any ob-gyn. Their lives, needless to say, have been severely and negatively impacted."

In a statement, Hopkins said the settlement would be paid through its insurance policy and "will not in any way compromise the ability" of the health system to serve its patients, staff and community. "It is our hope that this settlement, and the findings by law enforcement that the images were not shared, helps those affected achieve a measure of closure," the hospital added.

Levy, a Jamaica-born New Yorker who was 54 at the time of his suicide, was a popular ob-gyn who practiced in the poorer precincts of Baltimore. According to the Sun, he had a reputation of going out of his way to assist patients, such as driving through snow-storms to deliver a patient's child.

Monday, July 21, 2014

Hire purchase agreement


Introduction
Purchase and sale of goods under Hire-Purchase system is governed by the Hire-Purchase Act, 1972. This Act was passed on 8th June, 1972 and came into force w.e.f. September 1, 1973.
Here, the word “hire” denotes, the sum payable periodically by the hirer under a hire-purchase agreement.
Under the Hire Purchase System, the owner of the goods lets his goods on hire and gives an option to the hirer to purchase the goods in accordance with a specific agreement called Hire Purchase Agreement .
Agreement includes:-
ϖ Possession of goods is delivered by the owner thereof to a person on condition that such person pays the agreed amount in periodical instalments.
ϖ The property in the goods is to pass to such person on the payment of the last of such instalments
ϖ Such person has a right to terminate the agreement at any time before the property so passes.
“Hire-Purchase Price” means the total sum payable by the hirer under a hire-purchase agreement in order to complete the purchase of, or the acquisition of property in, the good to which the agreement relates and includes and sum so payable by the hirer under hire-purchase agreement by way of a deposit or other initial payment, or credited or to be credited to him under such agreement on account of any such deposit or payment, whether that sum is to be or has been paid to the owner or to any other person or is to be or has been discharged by payment of money or by transfer or delivery of goods or by any other means; but does not include any sum payable as a penalty or as compensation or damages for breach of the agreement.
“Hirer” means the person who obtains or has obtained possession of goods from an owner under a hire-purchase agreement, and includes a person to whom the hirer’s rights or liabilities under the agreement have passed by agreement or by operation of law.
“Owner” means the person who lets or has let, delivers or has delivered possession of goods; to a hirer under a hire-purchase agreement have passed and includes a person to whom the owner’s property in the goods or any of the owner’s right or liabilities under the agreement has passed by the assignment or by operation of law.
Contents of Hire-Purchase Agreement
According to the Act , every hire-purchase agreement shall state:
ϖ The Hire-Purchase price of the goods to which the agreement relates.
ϖ The cash price the goods, that is to say, the price at which the goods may be purchased by the hirer for cash.
ϖ The date on which the agreement shall be deemed to have commenced.
ϖ The number of instalments by which the hire-purchase price is to be paid, the amount of each of those instalment, and the date, or the mode of determining the date, upon which it is payable, and the person to whom and the place where it is payable.
ϖ The goods to which the agreement relates, in a manner sufficient to identify them.
Right of Hirer to Purchase
The hirer may, at any item during the continuance of hire-purchase agreement and after giving the owner at least 14 days’ notice in writing of his intention so to do, complete the purchase of the goods by paying to the owner the hire-purchase price or the balance thereof as reduced by the rebate which shall be equal to two-thirds of an amount which bears to the hire-purchase charges the same proportion as the balance of the hire-purchase price. ‘Hire Purchase’ charges means the difference between the hire-purchase price and the cash price as stated in the hire-purchase agreement.
Rights of Hirer to Terminate
The hirer has a right to terminate the agreement at any time before the property so passes and the final payment under the hire-purchase agreement falls due, after giving 14 days’ notice and returning the goods. Payments made by the hirer prior to the final payment are treated as payments in respect of hire and are not returned to the hirer in case he does not continue the contract.
Obligation of hirer in respect of care of the goods
The hire-purchaser, during that period when he is in possession of the goods, is supposed to take all such care of the goods as a prudent person does in his own case. He cannot damage, destroy, pledge or sell such good.
Hire-Purchase, Hire & Sale Contracts
Hire-purchase contract is different from:-
¬ Hire
¬ Sale contracts -
In the case of hirer the ownership in property is never transferred to the hirer by the owner, and that is, the property must be returned to its owner. In the case of sale, the ownership in property is transferred to the buyer immediately at the time of the contract, that is, the property cannot be returned to its seller. Hire-purchase contract provides special type of provision which distinguishes it from both hire and sale contracts. In the hire-purchase contract the buyer of goods which is termed as hire- purchaser is given the right of retaining or rejecting the property at his own option.
Hire-Purchase Price
Hire-Purchase price must not be confused with cash retail price or cash price. Cash retail price is arrived at by the hire-vendor by adding profit to the cost price of goods. Hire purchase price, on the other hand, is arrived at by adding:-
¬ Profit
¬ Interest to the cost price of goods. Hire- vendor charges interest partly for the credit granted by him and partly for covering the risks attached to the business. Thus, hire purchase price is more than retail price.
Case-Laws
In K.L. Johar & Company v/s. Deputy Commercial tax officer
It was held that a hire-purchase agreement is distinct from a sale in which the price is to be paid later by instalments. In the case of sale in which the price is to be paid by instalment, the property passes as soon as the sale is made even though the price has not been fully paid and may later be paid by instalments. The distinguishing feature of a hire-purchase agreement is that the property does not pass when the option is finally exercised after complying with all terms of the agreement.
In other words, a hire-purchase agreement has two elements:-
ϖ Element of Bailment .
ϖ Element of Sale, in the sense that it contemplates an eventual sale when all the terms of the agreement are satisfied and the option is exercised by the intending purchaser, a sale takes place of the goods which till than had been hired.
The previous decision in the case of P.V. Sadasivan v/s. Industrial Credit & Syndicate Limited
It was held that under the agreement the owner would always remain as owner till the entire hire purchase charges are paid. There was a seizure of vehicle for non-payment of instalments on sale of the vehicle; the owner would be entitled to retain the sale price. Amount received from sale of vehicle cannot be adjusted towards the amount due from hire.
In Jaya Bharat Credit & Investment Company Limited v/s. C.S.T
It was reiterated that Hire Purchase Agreement has two elements.
Now, the question which aroused before the court to decide was whether the agreement is a hire purchase agreement or a loan agreement. This was decided in the case—
InSundaram Finance Limited v/s. State of Kerala
It was held that the true effect of a transaction may be determined from the terms of agreement considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances. This case briefly highlights the distinction between a transaction for hire purchase and a transaction for sale.
The same parameter was followed in the case of Tarun Bhargava v/s. State of Haryana
Here, in this case it was decided that, when a customer enters into an agreement with a finance company for purchase of a vehicle and the vehicle is purchased in the name of customer, the ownership remains with the customer only and the intention of the parties in such case is to secure payment, the agreement would be a loan transaction even though it is referred to as hire purchase finance agreement.
In the case of Mass v/s. Pepper
It was held by the House of Lords that the circumstances showed that the transaction in question was merely colourable and was a loan on the security of the hire purchase agreement.
In the case of Polsky v/s. S and A Services Limited
Lord Goddard , C.J. held that the court is to look through or behind the document and to get at the reality and if in reality the documents are only given as a security for money then they are bills of sale.
In the case of The Instalment Supply Limited v/s. Sales Tax Officer
The question aroused before the court was to decide, when Sales Tax does takes place under a Hire-Purchase Agreement.
Here, the petitioner is a limited company with its registered office located at New Delhi. It carries on business of financing the purchase of motor vehicles. The person desiring to purchase a motor vehicle enters into a hire purchase agreement with the petitioner company. It may be useful to give within a short compass the terms of the agreement. The company charges the hirer can initial deposit by way of premium as a consideration for granting the lease of the vehicle, which deposit becomes the absolute property of the company, the premium charged as aforesaid is a substantial amount, being usually 25 % of the prices in respect of new vehicles. The hirer undertakes to pay the instalments and when all instalments are paid, the vehicle becomes the property of the hire at his option, on payment of rupee one to the company, as a consideration for the option, until all the stipulated instalments have been paid, the vehicle becomes the property of the hirer at his option, of the company as owners. The hirer is delivered possession of the vehicle and he remains responsible to the company for damage or destruction or loss. The hirer has to pay interest at the rate of one per cent per mensem on all sums overdue until the option of purchase is exercised by the hirer; he is at liberty to return the vehicle.
Supreme Court distinguished two classes of contract-
An agreement to sell is a pure contract whereas; a sale is a contract plus conveyance. By an agreement to sale is jus in personance and is caused by a sale a jus in rem which is also transferred. Where goods have been sold and buyer makes the fault than the seller may sue for the contract price on the count of ‘goods bargained and sold’ but when an agreement to buy is broken, the seller‘s normal remedy is an action for illiquidity damages. If an agreement to sell be personal remedy against the seller. The goods are still the property of the seller, and he can dispose of them as he likes, but if there has been a sale and a seller breaks his engagement to deliver the goods, the buyer has not only a personal remedy against the seller but also the usual proprietary remedies in respect of the goods themselves. In many cases, too, he can follow the goods into hands of third parties. Again, if there be an agreement of sale and the goods are destroyed, the loss as a rule falls on the seller, while if there has been a sale, the loss as rule falls upon the buyer though the goods may have come to his position.
In the case ofShogun Finance Ltd v Hudson
It is acontract law decided in the House of Lords, on the subject of mistaken identity as a basis for rescission of a contract. The case has been the subject of much criticism in failing to effectively clarify the area of mistake to identity.
There was a rogue who went to buy a Mitsubishi Shogun on hire purchase. The rogue told Shogun Finance Ltd that his name was Mr Patel and produced Mr Patel’s driving licence. The finance company did a credit check on Mr Patel, finding no problems, and the rogue drove away. Then, the rogue sold the car to Mr Norman Hudson. Under Section 27 ofHire Purchase Act 1964 a non-trade buyer of a car who buys in good faith from a hirer under a hire purchase agreement becomes the owner, so Mr Hudson would have been the owner if the hire purchase agreement were valid. Shogun Finance argued that it was not on the basis that there was a mistake as to identity. They therefore claimed against Mr Hudson for conversion.
It was held by the majority that there was no contract (rescission) of hire purchase between Shogun Finance and the rogue, so that the car was not Mr Hudson’s.
This followed the principle established Cundy v Lindsay that written agreements do not infer a presumption to sell to the immediate purchaser, where identity is of key importance to contracting.
But Lord Nicholls and Lord Millett dissented.
The judgments of Lord Nicholls and of Lord Millett are of interest, in their arguments to overrule Cundy v Lindsay, in effect protecting the third party purchaser:
It was held that–
“If the law of contract is to be coherent and rescued from its present unsatisfactory and unprincipled state, the House has to make a choice, either to uphold the approach adopted in Cundy v Lindsay and overrule the decisions, or to prefer these later decisions to Cundy v Lindsay.
They both considered the latter course is the right one, for a combination of reasons. It is in line with the direction in which, under the more recent decisions, the law has now been moving for some time. It accords better with basic principle regarding the effect of fraud on the formation of a contract. It seems preferable as a matter of legal policy”. As between two innocent persons the loss is more appropriately borne by the person who takes the risks inherent in parting with his goods without receiving payment. This approach fits comfortably with the intention of Parliament in enacting the limited statutory exceptions to the proprietary principle of nemo dat non quod habet.”
This would mean that in all cases of mistake to identity, contracts would be voidable, rather than immediately void. Therefore, should the original seller not repudiate the contract before the goods have been sold on, the third party would be protected.
The result of Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson is that the area of mistake to identity retains the ‘face to face’ distinction. This is that contracts of immediate vicinity differ from contracts made over distance. Such a distinction has been labelled “artificial and unfair to third parties, who bear the entire loss, where at least in the instant case, it is argued that Shogun Finance Ltd had far better means to uncover the rogue’s fraud, than the independent purchaser; in any case, the original seller is usually in the better position to protect and insure against such risks.
Conclusion
In today’s world, asset based financing has formed an integral part of the Financingscenario. This is because firms today can’t afford to buy theequipment’s and machineries outright. At present not all firms are that financially sound. Firms find it extremely difficult to obtain the financial aid from the normalsources. Firms that have the financial capacity prefer to hire or lease the equipment’s, it releases the financial burden as well as provides tax benefit of depreciation.Especially, Project financing has come of age as most of the banks today are intoproject financing. Earlier, it was chartered accountants who indulged into projectfinancing but now it is more of bank involvement. But today the growth in Project Finance is low whereas lease and hire purchase are on an upward trend with more and more companies providing their products onhire.So in the changing economic and financial environment of India, hire purchase financing has assumed an extremely important role.

Sunday, July 20, 2014

US judge grants access to a Gmail user's emails

A federal judge in New York has granted prosecutors access to a Gmail user's emails as part of a criminal probe, a decision that could fan the debate over how aggressively the government may pursue data if doing so may invade people's privacy.

US Magistrate Judge Gabriel Gorenstein said he had authorized a warrant to be served on Google for the emails of an unnamed individual who is the target of a money laundering investigation.

Gorenstein said his decision ran counter to several other judges' rulings in similar cases that sweeping warrants give the government improper access to too many emails, not just relevant ones.

But he said the law lets investigators review broad swaths of documents to decide which are covered by warrants.

Google did not respond to a request for comment.

The ruling came three months after US Magistrate Judge James Francis in New York said prosecutors can force Microsoft Corp to hand over a customer's email stored in an Ireland data center.

Microsoft has appealed, in what is seen as the first challenge by a company to a warrant seeking data stored overseas.

Companies including Verizon, AT&T, Cisco Systems and Apple have filed briefs in support of Microsoft, as has the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an advocacy group. A hearing is set for July 31 before US District Judge Loretta Preska in New York.

The government's ability to seize personal information has grown more contentious since former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden leaked secret documents in June 2013 to media outlets outlining the agency's massive data collection programs.

In June, a unanimous US Supreme Court ruled police generally need a warrant to search an arrested suspect's cellphone, citing privacy concerns.

Gorenstein's ruling joined a public debate playing out among several magistrate judges, who typically handle warrant requests. It is unusual to issue lengthy opinions on such matters particularly when, as in Gorenstein's case, the judge approves the application.

In April, John Facciola, a magistrate in Washington DC, rejected a warrant for the Apple email account of a defense contractor as part of a kickback investigation, one of several similar opinions he has authored recently.

Last year, a Kansas magistrate denied warrant applications for emails and records at Google, Verizon, Yahoo, Microsoft unit Skype and GoDaddy in a stolen computer equipment case.

Both judges said the warrants were overly broad.

On the other hand, several US appeals courts have rejected motions to suppress such searches, Gorenstein said.

Hanni Fakhoury, a lawyer with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, applauded Gorenstein for explaining his reasoning in writing, though he said he disagreed with the analysis.


Wednesday, July 16, 2014

Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation V.s Ahmedabad Green Belt Khedut Mandal May 2014

REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL NOs.1542-44 OF 2001


      Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation & Anr.        …Appellants
                                   Versus
      Ahmedabad Green Belt Khedut Mandal & Ors.        …Respondent
                             WITH
                      CIVIL APPEAL NOs.1545-50 OF 2001
      State of Gujarat                                          …Appellant
                                   Versus
      Ahmedabad Green Belt Khedut Mandal & Ors.        …Respondents
                            WITH
                        CIVIL APPEAL NOs.1551-56 OF 2001
      Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority         …Appellant
                                   Versus
      Ahmedabad Green Belt Khedut Mandal & Ors.        …Respondents

                                    WITH


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1864 OF 2014
      Vadodara Sheheri Sankulan Khedut Mandal & Ors.       ..Petitioners
                                  Versus
      Vadodara Urban Development Authority & Anr.           ..Respondents
                             WITH
            TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NOS. 12-13 OF 2010
      Bhikhubhai Vitthalbhai Patel & Ors. etc.
      …Petitioners
                                   Versus
      The State of Gujarat & Ors.                            …Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T
      Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
      1.    Civil Appeal Nos.1542-44 of 2001 have been preferred challenging
      the impugned judgment and order dated 24.11.2000,  passed  in  Special
      Civil Application Nos.1189, 4494 and 4659 of 1998 by the High Court of
      Gujarat  at  Ahmedabad,  wherein  the  Writ  Petition  filed  by   the
      respondents has been partly allowed holding that Section  40(3)(jj)(a)
      of  the  Gujarat  Town  Planning  and  Urban  Development  Act,   1976
      (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act 1976’) would  be   operative  for
      the land other than the land covered by Section 20(2) of the Act 1976,
      though upheld the validity of Section 40(3)(jj) of the Act 1976.
            Civil Appeal Nos.1545-50 of 2001  have  been  preferred  by  the
      State of Gujarat against the same judgment raising  the  grievance  to
      the same extent.
            Civil  Appeal  Nos.1551-56  of  2001  have  been  filed  by  the
      Ahmedabad Urban Development  Authority  (hereinafter  referred  to  as
      `AUDA’) against the same  judgment  passed  in  same  cases  alongwith
      Special Civil Application Nos.4859, 5934, 7476 of  1998  and  4271  of
      2000.
            Civil Appeal No.  1864  of  2014  has  been  filed  against  the
      impugned judgment and order dated 9.10.2009 passed by the  High  Court
      of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No.10912 of 2009,
      wherein the matter stood disposed of in terms of the subject matter in
      appeals referred to above.
           In  Transferred  Case  (C)  Nos.12-13  of  2010,  Writ  Petition
      Nos.2879 and 2880 of 2009  had  been  filed  by  the  tenure  holders/
      petitioners before the High Court of Gujarat and as the  same  factual
      and legal issues are involved therein, the petitions stood transferred
      to this court.
      2.    As similar factual and legal issues  are  involved  in  all  the
      cases for convenience T.P. (C) Nos. 12-13 of  2010  and  Civil  Appeal
      Nos. 1542-44 of 2001 are taken to be the leading cases.
             All  these  matters  relate  to  the  validity  and  issues  of
      interpretation of Section 40(3)(jj)  of the Act 1976  and  application
      of certain statutory provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban
      Development Rules, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules 1979’).
      The basic question that has been  raised  on  behalf  of  the  tenure-
      holders (Association of land owners) is that  whether  the  provisions
      contained in Sections 40(3)(jj) of the Act  1976  are  ultra-vires  of
      Articles  14,  19  and  300-A  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  1950
      (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  ‘Constitution’)  and  have   also
      challenged the action  on  the  part  of  the  Municipal  Corporations
      (Ahmedabad and Surat)  for  declaring  the  intention  to  frame  town
      planning schemes by issuing notifications, and further  to  hold  that
      the action of the Municipal Corporations to  take  away  land  of  the
      tenure-holders to the extent of 50%  without paying  any  compensation
      as ultra-vires and further challenged the  respective  resolutions  of
      the State Government in this regard.
            The main contention of the respondents before the High Court was
      that by way of the impugned legislation, the appellants have  designed
      a circuitous method to acquire  land  without  paying  any  amount  of
      compensation.  The ancillary ground urged is that the land  which  was
      not acquired on payment of compensation under Section 20  of  the  Act
      1976 cannot again  be  acquired  indirectly  and  without  payment  of
      compensation  by  introducing  the   impugned   legislation   enabling
      Authority to prepare a town planning scheme and reserve  the  land  to
      the extent of specified percentage for  public  purposes  like  roads,
      parks, play grounds, gardens and open spaces. Further, as per  Section
      40(3)(jj)(a)(iv) of the Act, 1976 the sale of land by the  Appropriate
      Authority  for  raising   money   for   the   purpose   of   providing
      infrastructural facilities  is  beyond  legislative  competence  being
      outside the purview of Entry  18  of  List-II  and  Entry  20  of  the
      concurrent  list  contained  in  7th  Schedule  to  the  Constitution.
      Moreover, compensation payable under Section 82 of the  Act,  1976  in
      respect of property or right injuriously affected by  the  scheme,  on
      the basis of market value calculated on the date of issue of intention
      to frame a scheme, is not an adequate compensation.  Further,  it  was
      not justified under the town planning scheme or the urban  development
      to permit acquisition of certain percentage of properties of  citizens
      for its disposal in the hands of public authorities for the purpose of
      raising its fund, even to be used for further development.  Under  the
      Act 1976, Section  40(3)(j)  as  it  originally  stood,  provided  for
      reserving only 10 per cent in the town planning scheme  for  providing
      housing  accommodation  to  the  members  of  the   weaker   sections.
      Therefore, the amendment by which the said  area  has  been  increased
      from 10% to 15% is not only unwarranted but also illegal.


      3.    Facts and circumstances giving rise  to  these  matters  are  as
      under:
      A.    In 1963, Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation  (hereinafter  referred
      to as the ‘AMC’) prepared and submitted a development plan  under  the
      Bombay Town Planning Act, 1964 (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “Bombay
      Act”) whereby the  lands of the respondents known as the ‘green  belt’
      were kept for open space  and  recreation.  On  21.8.1965,  the  State
      Government sanctioned the development plan which came  into  force  on
      1.10.1965.
      B.    AMC prepared its revised development plan and  published  it  on
      15.1.1976 whereby lands of the respondents were reserved for   “public
      housing”.
      C.    The Bombay Act was replaced by the Act 1976 under which AUDA was
      alone competent to draft development plan.
      D.     The  State  Government  sanctioned  the  development  plan   on
      2.11.1987 which came into force on 3.12.1987 whereby the area known as
      ‘green belt’ was reserved for “public housing for different government
      organizations”.
      E.    The AUDA  prepared draft  revised  development  plan  which  was
      published on 29.11.1997. The land reserved  for  “public  housing  for
      different government organizations” was de-reserved and put under  the
      category as “restricted residential utility services  and  other  uses
      zones”.
      F.    The AUDA in exercise of the powers under Section 21 of  the  Act
      1976 came out with a draft revised development plan in the year  1998.


      G.    The  respondents herein filed a Writ Petition before the Gujarat
      High Court challenging the draft  revised  development  plan  and  for
      direction to the appellants herein to acquire their lands as  per  the
      plan of 1987 within a period of 6 months failing which the plan  would
      lapse.
      H.    The Act 1976 was amended on 1.5.1999 and Section  40(3)(jj)  was
      inserted. The writ petition was amended and the vires of  Sections  12
      and 40(3)(jj) of the Act 1976 were also challenged.
      I.    The  AUDA  vide  its  resolution  dated  5.5.1999  approved  the
      proposed revised development plan. Declarations were made in the  year
      2000 for making town planning schemes covering “restricted residential
      utility services and other uses zones”.
      J.    The writ petition was partly allowed  by  the  High  Court  vide
      impugned judgment and order dated 24.11.2000.
            Hence, these appeals.


      4.    We have heard  S/Shri  C.A.  Sundaram,  Shirish  H.  Sanjanwala,
      Suresh Shelat, Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel for  the  tenure-
      holders or association of farmers and S/Shri  Harish  N.  Salve,  T.R.
      Andhyarujina, learned  senior  counsel  and  Preetesh  Kapur,  learned
      counsel for the State and statutory authorities.


      5.    All the submissions advanced by the counsel for  the  respective
      parties are the same which had been agitated before the High Court and
      reference thereof has already been made.   Learned  counsel  appearing
      for the tenure-holders have submitted that the judgment  of  the  High
      Court as far as the validity of the statutory provision is  concerned,
      does not require any interference whatsoever  but  earmarking  of  the
      land to the extent of 50% without paying any compensation  amounts  to
      expropriation  and  in  all  circumstances  percentage  fixed  by  the
      statutory provisions is excessive.


      6.    On the contrary, learned counsel appearing  for  the  state  and
      statutory authorities have submitted that the judgments impugned  have
      made  the  scheme  unworkable  as  one  tenure  holder  may  get   all
      infrastructure facilities while the adjacent neighbour may not get any
      facility at all. The area which can be taken away by the authority for
      sale to the extent of 15% relates to the total  area  covered  by  the
      scheme and not from each and every plot.


      7.    In order to properly understand the  dispute  herein,  reference
      has to be made to various provisions of the Act 1976.  The Preamble of
      the Act 1976 indicates that the  purpose  of  the  legislation  is  to
      consolidate and amend the law relating to the making and execution  of
      development plans and town planning schemes in the State  of  Gujarat.
      Section 12 of the Act 1976 provides for proposals and reservations  to
      be made in  the  development  plan  for  the  approval  of  the  State
      Government.


      8.    Clause (x) of Section 2 of the  Act  1976  defines  “development
      plan” while clause (xxvi) thereof defines “scheme”.
            Section  9  of  the  Act  1976  provides  that  the  Development
      Authority shall prepare and submit the development plan to  the  State
      Government for the whole or  any  part  of  the  development  area  in
      accordance with  the  provisions  of  this  Act.  Section  10  thereof
      requires that a copy of draft development plan is to be kept open  for
      public inspection.
           Section 12 provides for the contents of draft  development  plan
      generally providing the manner in which the use of land  in  the  area
      covered by it shall be regulated and also  indicating  the  manner  in
      which the development therein shall be carried out.  In particular, it
      shall provide, so far as may be necessary,  proposal  for  designating
      the  use  of  the  land  for  residential,   industrial,   commercial,
      agricultural and recreational purposes; for the  reservation  of  land
      for public purposes, such as schools, college  and  other  educational
      institutions, medical and public health  institutions;  proposals  for
      designation of areas for  zoological  gardens,  green  belts,  natural
      reserves and sanctuaries; transport and communications, such as roads,
      highways, parkways, railways, waterways, canals and airport, including
      their extension and development; proposals for water supply, drainage,
      sewage disposal, other public utility amenities and service  including
      supply of electricity and  gas;  reservation  of  land  for  community
      facilities and services, etc.
           Section 20 of the Act reads as under:
           “?(1) The area development authority or any other  authority  for
           whose purpose land is designated in the final  development  plan
           for any purpose specified in clause (b), clause (d), clause (f),
           Clause (k), clause (n) or  clause  (0)  of  sub-section  (2)  of
           section 12, may acquire the land either by  agreement  or  under
           the provisions of the land Acquisition Act, 1894.
           (2) If the land referred to in sub-section (1) is  not  acquired
           by agreement within a period of ten years from the date  of  the
           coming  into  force  of  the  final  development  plan   or   if
           proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act,1894 (I of 1894), are
           not commenced within  such  period,  the  owner  or  any  person
           interested in the land may  serve  a  notice  on  the  authority
           concerned requiring it to acquire the land  and  if  within  six
           months from the date of service of such notice the land  is  not
           acquired or no steps are commenced  for  its  acquisitions,  the
           designation of the land as aforesaid shall  be  deemed  to  have
           lapsed”.


           Section 40(3) (j) & (jj)(a) of the Act reads as under:
           “(j) the reservation of land to the extent of  ten  percent;  or
           such percentage as near thereto as possible of  the  total  area
           covered under the scheme for the purpose  of  providing  housing
           accommodation  to  the  members  of  socially  and  economically
           backward classes of people.
           (jj) (a) the allotment of land from the total area covered under
           the scheme, to the extent of:


           (i) Fifteen percent for roads;


           (ii) Five percent for parks, playgrounds, garden and open space


            (iii) Five percent for social infrastructure such  as  schools,
           dispensary, fire brigade, public utility place as  earmarked  in
           the Draft Town Planning Scheme.


           (iv) Fifteen percent  for  sale  by  appropriate  Authority  for
           residential, commercial or industrial  use  depending  upon  the
           nature of development.


           Provided that the percentage of the allotment of land  specified
           in paragraphs (i) to (iii) may be  altered  depending  upon  the
           nature of development and for the  reasons  to  be  recorded  in
           writing;


           (b) the proceeds from the Sale of land referred to in para  (iv)
           of sub-clause (a) shall be used for  the  purpose  of  providing
           infrastructural facilities in the area covered under the scheme.




           (c) The land allotted for the purposes referred to in paragraphs
           (ii) and (iii)  of  sub-clause  (a)  shall  not  be  changed  by
           variation of schemes for the purpose other than public purpose.”

           Section 48 of the Act  1976  defines  the  power  of  the  State
      Government to sanction draft scheme.  Further, Section 48-A  reads  as
      under:


           “(1) Where a draft scheme  has  been  sanctioned  by  the  State
           Government under sub-section (2) of section 48, (hereinafter  in
           this section, referred to as 'the sanctioned draft scheme'), all
           lands required by the appropriate  authority  for  the  purposes
           specified in clause (c), (f), (g), or (h) of sub-section (3)  of
           section 40 shall vest absolutely in  the  appropriate  authority
           free from all encumbrances.


           (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect  any  right  of  the
           owner of the land vesting in  the  appropriate  authority  under
           that sub-section.”



            Section 77 of the Act 1976 deals with cost of scheme, which also
      includes all  sums  payable  as  compensation  for  land  reserved  or
      designated for any public purpose or for the purposes  of  appropriate
      authority which is solely beneficial to the  owners  of  the  land  or
      residents within the area of the scheme and also includes  portion  of
      the sums payable as compensation for land reserved or  designated  for
      any public purpose.  It also includes legal expenses incurred  by  the
      appropriate authority in making and in the execution  of  the  scheme.
      Clause (f) thereof reads as under:
           (f) any amount by which the total amount of the  values  of  the
           original plots exceeds the total amount of  the  values  of  the
           plots included in the final scheme, each  of  such  plots  being
           estimated at its market value at the date of the declaration  of
           intention to make a scheme, with all  the  buildings  and  works
           thereon at the said date and without reference  to  improvements
           contemplated in  the  scheme  other  than  improvements  due  to
           alteration of its boundaries.


           Clause (2) of Section 77 reads:


           (2) If in any case the total amount of the values of  the  plots
           included in the final scheme exceeds the  total  amount  of  the
           values of the original plots, each of such plots being estimated
           in the manner provided in clause (f) of  sub-section  (1),  then
           the amount of such excess shall be deducted in arriving  at  the
           costs of the scheme as defined in sub-section (1).


           Section 79 of the Act 1976  provides  for  contribution  towards
      costs of scheme.
           Section 82 of the Act 1976 reads as under:


           Compensation  in  respect  of  property  or  right   injuriously
           affected by scheme.


           The owner of any property or right which is injuriously affected
           by the making of a town planning scheme shall,  if  he  makes  a
           claim before the Town Planning  Officer  within  the  prescribed
           time, be entitled to be compensated in respect  thereof  by  the
           appropriate authority or by any person benefited  or  partly  by
           the appropriate authority and partly by such person as the  Town
           Planning Officer may in each case determine:


                 Provided that the value of such property or rights shall be
           deemed to be its market value at the date of the declaration  of
           intention to make a scheme  or  the  date  of  the  notification
           issued by the State Government under sub-section (1) of  section
           43 without reference to improvements contemplated in the scheme,
           as the case may be.


           Section 84 thereof deals with the cases in which amount  payable
      to owners exceeds amount due from  him.   As  per  the  provisions  of
      Section 84, if the owner of an original plot is not  provided  with  a
      plot in the preliminary scheme or if the  contribution  to  be  levied
      from him under Section 79 is less than the total amount to be deducted
      therefrom, the net amount of his loss, shall be payable to him.
           Section 85 of the Act 1976 deals with the  cases  in  which  the
      value of the developed plot is less than the  amount  payable  by  the
      owners.  In case the amount which would  be  due  to  the  appropriate
      authority under the Act from the owner of a plot to be included in the
      final  scheme  exceeds  the  value  of  such  plot  estimated  on  the
      assumption that till scheme has been completed, the owner of such plot
      has to make payment to authority of the amount of such  excess  within
      the prescribed period.
           Sub-Section (2) of Section 85 provides that on  meeting  certain
      legal requirements, the plot included in  the   final   scheme  “shall
      vest  absolutely  in  the  appropriate   authority   free   from   all
      encumbrances but subject to the provisions of the Act”.


      9.    Rule 22 of the Rules 1979 reads as:
           (1)  The  compensation  payable  under  section  45   shall   be
           difference between the  value  of  the  property  (inclusive  of
           structure) on the basis of the existing  use  and  that  on  the
           basis of permitted use both values being determined  as  on  the
           date of declaration of intention to prepare the scheme.


           (2) In making the valuation  on  the  basis  of  permitted  use,
           allowance shall be made for the expenses that  may  have  to  be
           incurred in so converting the existing  structures  as  to  make
           them suitable for permitted use.


           (3) In case provision is made for continuance  of  the  existing
           use for a number of years taking into consideration  the  future
           life of the structure the compensation payable shall be  limited
           to present  value  of  the  standing  structure  less  value  of
           materials at the end of such period.


           (4)      X                   X                     X


      10.   Form H attached to the Rules 1979 is a Form to be filled by  the
      Town Planning Officer while preparing the draft planning scheme and it
      clearly makes it evident that “any person who is injuriously  affected
      by the above town planning scheme, is entitled to claim the damages in
      accordance with Section 82 of the Act 1976”.


      11.   Form K attached to the said Rules 1979 is also to be  filled  up
      and sent by the Town Planning Officer while preparing the final  draft
      planning scheme as required under Section 52(3) and it  puts him under
      an obligation to determine and record as under:
           “(i)  The compensation payable to you under Section 80
           (ii)  Amount payable by you under Section 80
           (iii) Estimated amount of the increment under Section 78
           (iv)  Amount of incremental contribution under Section 79
           (v)   The compensation under Section 82
           (vi)  Net amount of contribution
           (vii) Net amount payable to you”


      12.   The aforesaid provisions read conjointly gives a  clear  picture
      that the scheme is just like  the  consolidation  proceedings  as  the
      land, belonging to various persons, covered by the scheme first be put
      into a pool and then the land be allocated for different purposes and,
      in such a way, after having all deductions for the purpose  of  either
      by way of acquisition of land under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  1894
      (hereinafter referred to as `Act 1894’) or the land  taken  under  the
      provisions of Section 40(3)(jj)(a) of  the  Act  1976,  the  loss  and
      profit of  individual  tenure  holder  is  to  be  calculated.   After
      assessing the market value on the date of declaration of the intention
      to frame a scheme and the value of the property after making all these
      deductions, adjustments, improvements etc. and, therefore, if a person
      has suffered any loss, his loss is to be made good from the  funds  of
      the scheme and if a person has gained  an  amount  equivalent  to  net
      gain, is to be recovered from him.


      13.   The main issue involved herein is whether after the lapse of the
      period for reservation as per Section 20(2) of the Act 1976,  can  the
      said land be again acquired by resorting to the provisions of  Section
      40 of the Act 1976.  In the present case,  the  State  Government  had
      sanctioned a development plan on 2.11.1987 which came  into  force  on
      3.12.1987 wherein the area known as the “green belt” was reserved  for
      “public housing for different  government  organizations”.   The  said
      area was deemed to be de-reserved  by  virtue  of  the  provisions  of
      Section 20 after the expiry of a period  of  10  years.   Despite  the
      respondents having served the six months’ notice, the  said  land  was
      still not acquired by the government.  It has been submitted on behalf
      of the respondents that having regard to the provisions of Section  20
      read with Section 40 of the Act 1976, the said land could not  be  re-
      acquired/re-designated by framing a town planning scheme.  Section 48-
      A of the Act 1976 provides for vesting  of  land  in  the  appropriate
      authority.  However, the said section does not cover  the  requirement
      under Section 40(3)(jj)(a) of the Act.  It  has  been  further  argued
      that the other relevant provision is Section 107 of the Act 1976 which
      provides that land needed for a town planning scheme shall  be  deemed
      to be land needed for a public purpose within the meaning of  the  Act
      1894. Therefore, without invoking the provisions of the Act 1894,  the
      said land could not be re-notified under Section 40 of the Act 1976.


      14.   After considering all the submissions of the parties,  the  High
      Court has recorded the following conclusions:
      I)    The contention that  prescribing  of  various  percentage  under
      Section 40(3)(jj)(a) of the Act  1976 amounts to excessive legislation
      is rejected. The unamended clause (jj)  of  Section  40  provided  for
      allotment of 10% of the land in the scheme or such percentage as  near
      thereto  as  possible  for  the  purpose  of  sale  for   residential,
      commercial and industrial use.  The present provision as exists  today
      has now specified various percentage of the land to be set  aside  for
      specific purpose, i.e. 15% for roads, 5% for parks, playgrounds  etc.,
      5%  for  social  infrastructure  and  15%  for  sale   for   providing
      infrastructural facilities.  There has only been an increase of 5%  in
      the percentage of land that  could  be  sold  of  by  the  appropriate
      authority as compared to an  increase  of  30%  as  contended  by  the
      respondents.   The  current  provision  now  only  specifies  specific
      percentage of the land to be set aside for the specified purpose which
      was already provided for in the Act  1976  and  there  is  no  further
      reservation that is provided.
      II)   Entry 18 of List II of the Constitution provides for legislative
      competence with respect to land  i.e.  rights  in  or  over  the  land
      including land improvement.   Entry  20  of  Concurrent  List  of  the
      Constitution deals with economic and social planning.  Therefore,  the
      State Legislature was  well  within  its  competence  to  specify  the
      percentage of areas to be demarcated/used for the  specified  purpose.
      Further, a mere increase of percentage of land to be demarcated for  a
      specific purpose can in no way said to be  an  excessive  legislation.
      Section 91 of the Act 1976 provides for  establishment  of  funds  for
      utilization by the appropriate authority in order to meet expenditures
      for the development of land, administration of the Act and such  other
      purpose as the State Government may direct.  With the increase in cost
      of construction, the requisite funds for development  would  naturally
      increase and therefore, there does not seem to be  any  impediment  in
      prescribing a higher percentage of land that is to be  sold  for  such
      purposes.
      III)  The respondents` claim to the benefit under Article 300-A of the
      Constitution which provides for a constitutional right to property  is
      also stood rejected.  Each and  every  claim  to  property  cannot  be
      termed as a right  to  property  and  any  legislation  prescribing  a
      reasonable restriction over the same is a valid exception to the  said
      Article.
      IV)   Even the contention of the  respondents  that  the  compensation
      prescribed under Section 82 of the  Act  1976  was  inadequate  stands
      rejected.


      15.    The  aforesaid   findings   have   been   challenged   by   the
      State/statutory authorities as well as  by  the  Association  of  land
      owners to the extent the findings have been recorded against them.


      16.   It is in this backdrop that we  have  to  test  the  submissions
      advanced on behalf of the parties in the light of law declared by this
      Court earlier on the issues involved herein.
           In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar etc.etc. v. State of Gujarat & Anr.,
      etc.etc.,  AIR 1995 SC 142, this Court held:
               “…Though  Articles  31  and  19(1)(f)  of  the  Constitution
           accorded to ‘property’ the status as a fundamental right,  there
           emerged conflict between the animation of the  Founding  Fathers
           and the judicial interpretation on the word ‘compensation’  when
           private property was expropriated to subserve common good or  to
           prevent common detriment…..Concomitantly legislature  has  power
           to acquire the property of private person exercising  the  power
           of eminent domain by a law for public purpose. The law  may  fix
           an amount or which may be determined  in  accordance  with  such
           principles as may be laid therein and given in  such  manner  as
           may be specified in such law. However, such  law  shall  not  be
           questioned on the grounds that the amount  so  fixed  or  amount
           determined is  not  adequate.  The  amount  fixed  must  not  be
           illusory. The principles laid to determine the  amount  must  be
           relevant to the determination of the amount….. We are  conscious
           that Parliament omitted Article 31(2) altogether.  However  when
           the State exercises its power of eminent domain and acquires the
           property of private person or deprives him of his  property  for
           public purpose, concomitantly fixation  of  the  amount  or  its
           determination be must in accordance with such principles as laid
           therein and the amount given in such manner as may be  specified
           in such a law…..”




      17.   In Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan  &  Ors.,  AIR  2002  SC
      1533, this Court held:
              “There  must  be  proper  pleadings  and  averments  in   the
           substantive petition before the  question  of  denial  of  equal
           protection of infringement of fundamental right can be  decided.
           There is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality
           of enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it  to  show
           that there has been a clear transgression of the  constitutional
           principles. The presumption of constitutionality stems from  the
           wide power of classification  which  the  legislature  must,  of
           necessity  possess  in  making  laws  operating  differently  as
           regards different groups of persons in order to give  effect  to
           policies. It must be presumed that the  legislature  understands
           and correctly appreciates the need of its own people,  that  its
           laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience.”




      18.   In Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat & Ors., AIR 1986 SC
      468, this Court relied upon the  judgment  of  this  Court  in   Zandu
      Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. G.J. Desai, Civil Appeal No. 1034 of 1967
      decided on August 28, 1969 dealing with the  very  provisions  of  the
      Act,  wherein this Court had observed :
              “When the Town Planning Scheme comes into operation the  land
           needed by a local authority vests by virtue of Section 53(a) and
           that vesting for purposes of the guarantee under  Article  31(2)
           is deemed compulsory acquisition for a public purpose. To  lands
           which are subject to the scheme, the provisions of  Sections  53
           and 67 apply, and the compensation is  determined  only  in  the
           manner prescribed by the Act. There are therefore  two  separate
           provisions one for acquisition by the State Government, and  the
           other in  which  the  statutory  vesting  of  land  operates  as
           acquisition for the  purpose  of  town  planning  by  the  local
           authority. The State Government can acquire the land  under  the
           Land Acquisition Act, and the local  authority  only  under  the
           Bombay Town Planning Act.  There  is  no  option  to  the  local
           authority to resort to one  or  the  other  of  the  alternative
           methods which result in acquisition.  Hence  the  provisions  of
           Sections 53 and 67 are not invalid on the ground that they  deny
           equal protection of the  laws  or  equality  before  the  laws.”
                        (Emphasis added)




      19.   In Prakash Amichand Shah (Supra) this Court held:


               “…..All his functions are parts of the social  and  economic
           planning  undertaken  and  executed  for  the  benefit  of   the
           community at large and they cannot be done  in  isolation.  When
           such functions happen to be integral  parts  of  a  single  plan
           which in this case happens to be an urban development plan, they
           have to be viewed in their totality and not as  individual  acts
           directed against a single person or a few persons. It  is  quite
           possible that  when  statutory  provisions  are  made  for  that
           purpose, there would be some difference between their impact  on
           rights of individuals at one stage and their impact  at  another
           stage. As we have seen in this very Act there are three types of
           taking over of lands - first under Section  11,  secondly  under
           Section 53 and thirdly under Section 84 of the Act, each being a
           part of a single scheme but each one having  a  specific  object
           and  public  purpose  to  be  achieved.  While  as  regards  the
           determination of compensation it may be possible  to  apply  the
           provisions  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894   with   some
           modification as provided in the Schedule to the Act in the  case
           of lands acquired either under Section 11 or under Section 84 of
           the Act, in the case of lands which are  needed  for  the  local
           authority  under  the  Town  Planning  Scheme  which  authorises
           allotment of reconstituted plots to persons from  whom  original
           plots are taken, it is difficult to apply the provisions of  the
           Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The provisions of Section 32 and the
           other  financial  provisions  of  the  Act   provide   for   the
           determination of the cost of the scheme, the development charges
           to be levied and contribution to be made by the local  authority
           etc. It is only after all that exercise is done the  money  will
           be paid to or demanded from the owners  of  the  original  plots
           depending on the circumstances governing each case.  If  in  the
           above context the Act has made special provisions under Sections
           67 to 71 of the Act for determining compensation payable to  the
           owners of original plots who do not get the reconstituted  plots
           it cannot be said that there has been any violation  of  Article
           14 of the Constitution. It is seen that even  there  the  market
           value of the land taken is not lost sight of. The effect of  the
           provisions in Sections 67 to 71 of the Act has been explained by
           this Court in Maneklal Chhotalal v. M.G. Makwana,  AIR  1967  SC
           1373,  and in State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas, AIR  1969
           SC 634.


                  Thus it is seen that all the arguments based  on  Article
           14 and Article 31(2) of the Constitution against  the  Act  were
           repelled by the Constitution Bench in  the  Shantilal  Mangaldas
           (supra). With great respect, we approve of the decision  of  the
           court in this case…….We do not therefore find any  substance  in
           the contention that  the  Act  violated  Article  31(2)  of  the
           Constitution as it stood at the time when the Act was enacted or
           at              any              time               thereafter.”
              (Emphasis added)




      20.   This Court in the said case also explained the decision of  this
      Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust & Anr. v. Vithal  Rao  &  Ors.,  AIR
      1973 SC 689, wherein the High Court had held that as  the  acquisition
      was by the State, in all cases where the property was required  to  be
      acquired for the purposes of a scheme framed by  the  Trust  and  such
      being the position, it was not  open  to  the  State  to  acquire  any
      property under the provisions of  the  Act  1894  as  amended  by  the
      Improvement  Trust  Act  without  paying  compensation  on  the   same
      parameters and the solatium also. It was, therefore, held by the  High
      Court that the paras 10(2) and 10(3)  insofar  as  they  added  a  new
      clause 3(a) to Section 23 and a proviso to sub-section (2) of  Section
      23 of the Act 1894 were ultra vires  as  violating  the  guarantee  of
      Article 14 of the Constitution.
           This Court further held:
              “…..The development and planning carried out under the Act is
           primarily for the benefit of  public.  The  local  authority  is
           under an obligation to function according to the Act. The  local
           authority has to bear a part of the expenses of development.  It
           is in one sense a package deal. The proceedings relating to  the
           scheme are not  like  acquisition  proceedings  under  the  Land
           Acquisition Act, 1894.  Nor  are  the  provisions  of  the  Land
           Acquisition Act, 1894 made applicable  either  without  or  with
           modifications as in the case of  the  Nagpur  Improvement  Trust
           Act,  1936.  We  do  not  understand  the  decision  in   Nagpur
           Improvement Trust case (supra) as  laying  down  generally  that
           wherever land is taken away by the government under  a  separate
           statute compensation should be paid under the  Land  Acquisition
           Act, 1894 only and  if  there  is  any  difference  between  the
           compensation payable under the Land Acquisition  Act,  1894  and
           the  compensation  payable  under  the  statute  concerned   the
           acquisition under the statute would be discriminatory…..”




      21.   In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.,
      AIR 2003 SC 511, this Court held:
              “37.     The words “so far as may be” indicate the  intention
           of the Legislature to the effect that by providing  revision  of
           final development plan from time to time and at  least  once  in
           ten years, only the procedure or preparation thereof as provided
           therein,  is  required   to   be   followed.   Such   procedural
           requirements must  be  followed  so  far  as  it  is  reasonably
           possible. Section 21 of the Act, in our opinion,  does  not  and
           cannot mean that the substantial right conferred upon the  owner
           of the land or the person  interested  therein  shall  be  taken
           away. It is not and cannot be the intention of  the  Legislature
           that which is given by one hand should  be  taken  away  by  the
           other.
              38.  Section 21 does not envisage that despite the fact  that
           in terms of sub-section (2) of S. 20, the  designation  of  land
           shall lapse, the same, only because  a  draft  revised  plan  is
           made, would automatically give rise to revival thereof.  Section
           20 does not manifest a legislative intent  to  curtail  or  take
           away the right acquired by a land owner under S. 22  of  getting
           the land defreezed. In the event the submission of  the  learned
           Solicitor General is accepted the same would  completely  render
           the provisions of S. 20(2) otiose and redundant.
              39. Sub-section  (1)  of  S.  20,  as  noticed  hereinbefore,
           provides for an enabling provision in terms  whereof  the  State
           become entitled to acquire  the  land  either  by  agreement  or
           taking recourse to the provisions of the Land  Acquisition  Act.
           If by reason of a revised plan, any other area is sought  to  be
           brought within the purview of the development plan, evidently in
           relation thereto the State will  be  entitled  to  exercise  its
           jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of S. 20  but  it  will  bear
           repetition to state that the same would not confer any other  or
           further power upon the State to get the duration of  designation
           of land, which has been lapsed, extended. What  is  contemplated
           under S. 21 is to meet the changed situation  and  contingencies
           which might not have been contemplated while preparing the first
           final development plan. The power of the State enumerated  under
           sub-section (1) of S. 20 does not become ipso  facto  applicable
           in the event of issuance of a revised plan as the said provision
           has been specifically mentioned therein so that  the  State  may
           use the same power in a changed situation.”


      (See also: Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. M/s. Pure  Industrial
      Cock & Chem. Ltd. & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 2458; and  Shrirampur  Municipal
      Council, Shrirampur v. Satyabhamabai Bhimaji Dawkher & Ors., (2013)  5
      SCC 627)


      22.   In view of the provisions  of  the  Act  1976  and  particularly
      Section 40 (3)(jj)(a)(iv), the  question  does  arise  as  to  whether
      selling of land provided therein maximum  to  the  extent  of  15%  is
      illegal; and whether on lapsing of designation under  the  development
      plan under Section 20, can there be any fresh  reservation/designation
      under the town planning scheme for the same land which  is  designated
      and whether such land if acquired, can only be acquired  independently
      under the Act 1894.


      23.    As we have explained hereinabove that the town planning  scheme
      provides for pooling  the  entire  land  covered  by  the  scheme  and
      thereafter re-shuffling and reconstituting of plots, the market  value
      of the original plots and final plots is to be assessed and  authority
      has to determine as to whether a land owner has suffered  some  injury
      or  has  gained  from  such  process.  Re-constitution  of  plots   is
      permissible as provided under the scheme of the Act as is evident from
      cogent reading of Section 45(2)(a)(b)(c)  and  Section  52(1)(iii)  in
      accordance with Section 81 of the Act 1976. By re-constitution of  the
      plots, if anybody suffers injury, the statutory provisions provide for
      compensation under Section 67(b) read with Section 80 of the Act 1976.
       By this re-constitution  and  readjustment  of  plots,  there  is  no
      vesting of land in the local authority and therefore, the Act provides
      for payment of non-monetary compensation and  such  a  mode  has  been
      approved  by  the  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  Shantilal
      Mangaldas (supra), wherein this Court has held that  when  the  scheme
      comes into force all rights in the original  plots  are  extinguished,
      and simultaneously therewith ownership springs in  the  re-constituted
      plots. It does not predicate ownership  of  the  plots  in  the  local
      authority, and no process -  actual  or  notional  -  of  transfer  is
      contemplated in that appropriation. Under clause (a)  of  Section  53,
      vesting of land in local authority takes place only on commencement of
      scheme into force. The concept that lands vest in  a  local  authority
      when the intention to make a scheme is notified, is against the  plain
      intendment of the Act. Even steps taken by the State  do  not  involve
      application of the doctrine of eminent domain.


      24.   In Maneklal Chhotalal (supra), re-adjustment of plots  has  been
      approved by this Court observing as under:
           “Even if, an original plot owner is allotted smaller  extent  of
           land in the  final  plot  and  has  to  pay  certain  amount  as
           contribution, having regard to the scheme and its objects,  this
           is inevitable and is not deprivation.”




      25.   Thus, it is evident that in case a land owner  is  not  provided
      with a final plot, amount of his loss  would  be  payable  to  him  as
      required under Section 84 of the Act 1976. (It is  agreed  by  learned
      counsel for the parties that there is not  a  single  instance  herein
      where the land owner is deprived of his land completely  and  has  not
      been given a re-constituted plot). However, it is suggested by learned
      counsel for the State that in such an event, such tenure holder  would
      be entitled for market value of the land to be  determined  under  the
      Act 1976 and the provisions of the Act 1894 would not be applicable in
      view of the judgment of this Court in Prakash Amichand  Shah  (supra).
      Be that as it may, as there is no such instance where the  land  owner
      is deprived completely of his land  and  does  not  get  reconstituted
      plots, we do not want to proceed further with an academic question.


      26.   In Shantilal Mangaldas (supra), this Court held:
           “The provisions relating to payment of compensation and recovery
           of contributions are vital to the successful  implementation  of
           the scheme. The owner of the re-constituted plot  who  gets  the
           benefit  of  the  scheme  must  make  contribution  towards  the
           expenses of the scheme; the owner who loses  his  property  must
           similarly be compensated.”


           The aforesaid judgment is still a good law on this aspect.


      27.   In view of  the  commencement  of  the  44th  Amendment  of  the
      Constitution w.e.f. 20.6.1979, whereby  Articles  31(2)  and  19(1)(g)
      have been deleted, we do not  propose  to  go  into  the  enquiry  and
      consider the judgments in State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bella  Banerjee
      & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 170; and Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India,
      AIR 1970 SC 564. More so, the judgments in P.  Vajravelu  Mudaliar  v.
      The Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition, West Madras & Anr.,
      AIR 1965 SC 1017; and Union of India v. The Metal Corporation of India
      & Anr., AIR 1967 SC  637,  have  been  over-ruled  by  this  Court  in
      subsequent  judgment.  (See:  Ishwari  Khetan  Sugar  Mills  (P)  Ltd.
      etc.etc. v. The State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1955).
           Thus, there is no fundamental right to hold  property.  But  the
      right to compensation on compulsory  acquisition  is  still  available
      under the second proviso to Article 31A subject to the  limitation  as
      specified therein. However, we need not elaborate the same as the said
      averment is not argued before us.


      28.   Article 300-A of the Constitution though creates a  human  right
      being a constitutional provision, but  is  not  a  fundamental  right.
      Article 300-A provides that no person can be deprived of his  property
      except by authority of law. The Town Planning  Act  is  definitely  an
      authority of law by which a person is deprived of his property  if  we
      assume that  the  town  planning  scheme  deprives  a  person  of  his
      property, though it is not so in view of the judgments of  this  Court
      in Shantilal Mangaldas (supra) and Prakash Amichand Shah (supra).


      29.   So far as the question that upon lapsing  of  designation  under
      the  development  plan  under  Section  20   there   cannot   be   any
      reservation/designation under a town  planning  scheme  for  the  same
      land, is to be understood reading  the  provisions  of  the  Act  1976
      cogently. The development plan is prepared under Chapter II  and  town
      planning scheme is made under Chapter  V.   Therefore,  they  are  two
      different things. The development plan is a macro plan for a vast area
      wherein a town planning  scheme  is  minor  scheme  within  the  town.
      Section 40(1) simply provides that in  the  making  of  town  planning
      scheme the authority has to have regard to the  final  development  of
      the plan, if any. Thus, the words “having regard  to  the  development
      plan” in Section 40 means that town planning scheme  cannot  disregard
      or ignore the designation/reservation made in the development plan.
           Under Section  20  of  the  Act,  it  is  provided  that  if  an
      acquisition does not take place by agreement or under the Act 1894, in
      respect of certain lands designated in the final development plan  for
      the six purposes mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 12  within  a
      period of 10 years from the coming into force of the final development
      plan, the designation of the land under these clauses shall be  deemed
      to  have  lapsed.  Therefore,  the  provision  for  lapsing   of   the
      designation of the land does not take it out of the  purview  of  town
      planning scheme and such a provision does not prevent the making of  a
      provision in a town planning scheme for any reservation  specified  in
      Section 40(3).  If the judgment of the High Court  on  this  issue  is
      approved, the town planning scheme would be impermissible.  Thus, even
      after the lapse of designation of the land under Section  20,  a  town
      planning scheme will have to include the land for roads, open  spaces,
      gardens under Section 40(3)(e), reservation of land for  accommodation
      to members of socially and economically  backward  classes  of  people
      under  Clause  40(3)(j)  but  not  for  items  mentioned  in   Section
      40(3)(jj)(a) would lead to absurdity.


      30.    Section  40(3)(jj)  only  regulates  discretion  of  the   Area
      Development Authority (ADA) while making the draft  development  plan.
      The land acquired under Section 20 read with Section  12  of  the  Act
      1976 would need infrastructural facility and the original  plot  which
      is acquired would require to be re-constituted as a final plot and  to
      make a building site. The settled  legal  proposition  in  respect  of
      interpretation of statute is that the provisions of the Act have to be
      read  as  a   whole   and   therefore   the   provision   of   Section
      40(3)(jj)(a)(iv) for sale has to be read inconsonance/conjointly  with
      the other statutory provisions and not in isolation. The sale upto the
      extent of 15% is from the total area covered under the scheme and  not
      in respect of every plot of  land.  In  order  to  generate  financial
      resources for the development of infrastructure, the saleable plot for
      residential,  commercial  and  industrial  use  are  allotted  by  the
      appropriate authority.  Similarly, while  re-constituting  the  plots,
      final plot is offered to the original owner for its beneficial use.


      31.    The  High  Court  has  committed  an  error  interpreting   the
      provisions under  challenge  as  it  failed  to  appreciate  that  the
      provisions of the Town Planning Scheme in Chapter-V, no where indicate
      that the lands under Section 20 cannot be subject matter of  the  Town
      Planning  Scheme.  The  interpretation  given  by   the   High   Court
      tantamounts to rewriting the provisions of the Act 1976  as  the  High
      Court has held that the land under Section 20 cannot be the subject of
      Section 40(3)(jj). Section 40(3)(jj)(a) only illustrates and  provides
      the guidance to the authority.


      32.   So far as the  observation  made  by  this  Court  in  Bhavnagar
      University (supra) is concerned, the court held that  the  land  which
      has been de-reserved under Section 20  cannot  be  subject  matter  of
      revised development plan  under  Section  20(1).  However,  the  issue
      involved in that case was in respect of applicability  of  Section  40
      while framing the scheme, and  this  court  had  not  dealt  with  the
      provisions of the scheme under Chapter-V of the Act.


      33.   A Constitution Bench of this Court in K.L. Gupta & Ors.  v.  The
      Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors.,  AIR 1968 SC  303  had
      examined the validity of the provisions of Sections 9, 10, 11, 12  and
      13 of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred  to  as
      the `Act 1954’) and held as under:
              “With regard to the complaint that the period  of  ten  years
           fixed  under  s.  11(3)  of  the  Act  was  too  long,  and   an
           unreasonable restriction on the rights of a land owner  to  deal
           with his land as he pleased, it is enough to say that in view of
           the immensity of the task of the local authorities to find funds
           for the acquisition of lands for public purposes,  a  period  of
           ten years was not too long.
              …………..No one can be heard to say that local  authority  after
           making up its mind to acquire land for a public purpose must  do
           so within as short a period of time as possible. It would not be
           reasonable to place such a restriction on the power of the local
           authority which is out to create better  living  conditions  for
           millions of people in a vast  area.  The  finances  of  a  local
           authority are not unlimited nor have they the power  to  execute
           all schemes of proper utilisation of land set apart  for  public
           purposes as expeditiously as one would like. They  can  only  do
           this by proceeding with their  scheme  gradually,  by  improving
           portions of the area at a time,  obtaining  money  from  persons
           whose lands had been improved and augmenting the same with their
           own resources so as to be able to take up the  improvement  work
           with regard to another area  marked  out  for  development.  The
           period of ten years fixed at first cannot therefore be taken  to
           be the ultimate length of time within which they had to complete
           their work. The legislature fixed upon this period  as  being  a
           reasonable one in the circumstances obtaining at the  time  when
           the statute was enacted. We cannot  further  overlook  the  fact
           that modifications to the final development plan were not beyond
           the range of possibility. We  cannot  therefore  hold  that  the
           limit of time fixed under s. 4  read  with  s.  11(3)  forms  an
           unreasonable restriction on the rights of a person to  hold  his
           property.”                                             (Emphasis
           added)


      34.   In Shantilal Mangaldas (supra), a  Constitution  Bench  of  this
      Court examined the scheme under the  Act  1954  which  was  applicable
      earlier to the State of Gujarat  wherein  with  respect  of  the  land
      situated therein, the Borough Municipality of Ahmedabad  declared  its
      intention of making a  town  planning  scheme  vide  resolution  dated
      18.4.1927 under the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1915, wherein  the  High
      Court of Gujarat had allowed the writ petition filed  by  the  tenure-
      holders. This Court reversed the said judgment observing as under:
              “22. The following principles  emerge  from  an  analysis  of
           Clauses (2) and (2A): compulsory acquisition or requisition  may
           be made for  a  public  purpose  alone,  and  must  be  made  by
           authority of law. Law which deprives a person  of  property  but
           does  not  transfer  ownership  of  the  property  or  right  to
           possession of the  property to the State or a corporation  owned
           or  controlled  by  the  State  is  not  a  law  for  compulsory
           acquisition or requisition. The  law,  under  the  authority  of
           which property is compulsorily acquired or  requisitioned,  must
           either fix the amount of compensation or specify the  principles
           on which, and the manner in which, the  compensation  is  to  be
           determined and given. If  these  conditions  are  fulfilled  the
           validity of the law cannot be questioned on  the  plea  that  it
           does not provide adequate compensation to the owner…………….
              The first contention urged by Mr. Bindra  cannot,  therefore,
           be accepted……….
              The principal argument which found favour with the High Court
           in holding Section 53  ultra  vires  is  that  when  a  plot  is
           reconstituted and out of that plot a smaller area  is  given  to
           the owner and the remaining area is utilised for public purpose,
           the area so utilised vests in the local authority for  a  public
           purpose,  and  since  the  Act  does  not  provide  for   giving
           compensation which is a just equivalent of the land expropriated
           at the date of extinction  of  interest,  the  guaranteed  right
           under Article 31(2) is infringed…………….
              There is no vesting  of  the  original  plots  in  the  local
           authority nor transfer of the rights of the local  authority  in
           the reconstituted plots. A part or even the whole plot belonging
           to an owner may go to form a reconstituted  plot  which  may  be
           allotted to another person, or may  be  appropriated  to  public
           purposes  under  the  scheme.  The  source  of  the   power   to
           appropriate the whole or a part of the original plot in  forming
           a  reconstituted  plot  is  statutory.  It  does  not  predicate
           ownership of the plot in the local authority,  and  no  process-
           actual  or  notional-of  transfer  is   contemplated   in   that
           appropriation. The lands covered by the scheme are subjected  by
           the Act to the power of the local authority to readjust  titles,
           but no reconstituted plot  vests  at  any  stage  in  the  local
           authority unless it is needed for a purpose  of  the  authority.
           Even Under Clause (a) of Section  53  the  vesting  in  a  local
           authority of land required by it is on the coming into force  of
           the scheme. The concept that lands vest in the  local  authority
           when the intention to make a scheme is notified is  against  the
           plain intendment of the Act…………….
              The question that falls then to be considered is whether  the
           scheme of the Act which provides for adjustment  of  the  market
           value of land at the date of the  declaration  of  intention  of
           making a scheme against market value of the land which  goes  to
           form the reconstituted plot, if any, specifies a  principle  for
           determination of compensation to be given within the meaning  of
           Article 31(2) ………….
              On the second branch of the argument  it  was  urged  that  a
           provision for giving the value of  land,  not  on  the  date  of
           extinction of interest of the owner, but on the footing  of  the
           value prevailing at the date of the declaration of the intention
           to  make  a  scheme,  is  not  a  provision   for   payment   of
           compensation……………
              ……………The method of determining  compensation  in  respect  of
           lands  which  are  subject  to  the  town-planning  schemes   is
           prescribed in the Town Planning Act. There is  no  option  under
           that Act to acquire the land either under the  Land  Acquisition
           Act or under the Town Planning Act. Once the draft town-planning
           scheme is sanctioned, the land becomes subject to the provisions
           of the Town Planning Act, and  the  final  town-planning  scheme
           being sanctioned,  by  statutory  operation  the  title  of  the
           various owners is readjusted and the lands needed for  a  public
           purpose vest in the local authority. Land required  for  any  of
           the purposes  of  a  town-planning  scheme  cannot  be  acquired
           otherwise than  under  the  Act,  for  it  is  settled  rule  of
           interpretation of statutes that when  power  is  given  under  a
           statute to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be
           done in that way or not at all………………”    (Emphasis added)


      35.   Thus, we do not find any force in the submissions made on behalf
      of the tenure-holders for the simple reason that after the judgment in
      Bhikhubhai Vithalbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat & Anr.,  AIR  2008  SC
      1771, it was not permissible for the statutory  authorities  to  bring
      any scheme whatsoever for the reason that as per that  judgment  also,
      land could be used for residential purposes and the authority’s  draft
      scheme also provides for residential purposes. That does not mean that
      it would be used exclusively for residential  purpose  and  it  cannot
      have even small marketing place or a small dispensary.
      36.   Section 40 of the Act 1976 contains the words “regard being had”
      and thus it suggests that while the condition specified therein are to
      be taken into consideration they are only a guide and not fetters upon
      the exercise of power.


      37.   It is a settled legal proposition that hardship of an individual
      cannot be a ground to strike down a statutory provision for the reason
      that a result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil.  It
      is the duty of  the  court  to  give  full  effect  to  the  statutory
      provisions under all circumstances. Merely because  a  person  suffers
      from hardship  cannot  be  a  ground  for  not  giving  effective  and
      grammatical meaning to every word of the provisions  if  the  language
      used therein is  unequivocal.  (See:  The  Martin  Burn  Ltd.  v.  The
      Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1966 SC 529; Tata Power Company  Ltd.  v.
      Reliance Energy Limited & Ors., (2009) 16 SCC 659; and Rohitash  Kumar
      & Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 30).


      38.   The interpretation given by the High Court runs contrary to  the
      intention under the scheme and may frustrate the scheme itself  as  in
      the pockets left out in the scheme the  basic  amenities  may  not  be
      available. The result would be that a portion of  the  land  would  be
      left  without  infrastructural  facility  while  the   adjacent   area
      belonging to neighbours would be provided infrastructural facility.
      39.   In view thereof, we are of the considered opinion that the  High
      Court has recorded an erroneous finding that if a  designation  lapses
      under Section 20, the land cannot be again reserved in a town planning
      scheme, and further if the land cannot be acquired  under  Section  20
      for want of capacity to pay any compensation under the  Act  1894,  it
      cannot be allowed to be  acquired  indirectly  on  lesser  payment  of
      compensation as provided under the Act 1976. Thus, the judgment of the
      High Court to that extent is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
      40.    In  the  transferred  cases,  the  resolution  dated  16.5.2008
      providing the  extent  of  taking  over  the  land  to  50%  has  been
      challenged on the ground that in other similar  schemes  in  Vadodara,
      the maximum land taken by the State/Authority had been only upto  30%.
      Therefore, the deduction to the extent of  50% of the total land of  a
      tenure-holder is illegal acquisition or amounts to  expropriation  and
      not acquisition. It  is  further  submitted  by  Shri  Huzefa  Ahmadi,
      learned senior counsel appearing for the  petitioners  in  transferred
      cases that in case of non-agricultural land, the deduction may be upto
      20% and for agricultural land it may be  upto  30%.  Shri  Ahmadi  has
      placed a very heavy reliance on a chart filed by him showing  that  in
      other similar cases, a very lesser  area  had  been  deducted  by  the
      State/Authority and in the instant case 15% area had been proposed for
      sale without drawing the balance sheet. In such a fact-situation,  the
      cases have to be allowed.
      41.    On  the  contrary,  Shri  Preetesh  Kapur  appearing  for   the
      respondents has submitted that  it  is  pre-mature  to  challenge  the
      resolution dated 16.5.2008 as it is  a  first  step  to  initiate  the
      proceedings under the Act and the Rules. The draft scheme issued under
      Section 48 of the Act 1976 empowers the State Government to sanction a
      draft scheme and  clause  (3)  thereof  provides  that  if  the  State
      Government sanctions  the  scheme,  a  notification  shall  be  issued
      stating at what place and time the draft scheme shall be open for  the
      inspection of the public after which the  procedure  prescribed  under
      Sections 50 and 51 would be followed. At  that  stage  Rule  26  which
      provides that for the purpose of preparing the preliminary scheme  and
      final scheme, the Town Planning Officer shall give notice in Form  ‘H’
      of the date on which he will commence his duties and shall  state  the
      time as provided in Rule 37 within which the owner of any property  or
      right which is injuriously affected by the making of a scheme would be
      entitled under Section 82 to make a  claim  before  him.  Such  notice
      should be published in the official gazette also and the  law  further
      requires the filing of the objections and the personal hearing to such
      person who would be adversely affected.
      42.   In the instant  Transferred  Case,  as  the  authority  is  only
      dealing with the issues at a draft stage and the applicants have ample
      opportunity to file their objections  and  are  entitled  to  personal
      hearing as required under Rule  26  clause  (4),  the  matter  can  be
      adjudicated before the statutory authority.
            Therefore, in view of  the  above,  we  are  of  the  considered
      opinion that the apprehensions raised by the applicants at this  stage
      are  pre-mature.   Admittedly,  the  applicants   have   filed   their
      objections raising their grievance and they had also  been  given  the
      personal hearing by the  statutory  authorities  on  all  permissible,
      factual and legal grounds.  The  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the
      State/Authorities has submitted that in case the  applicants  are  not
      satisfied and make fresh objections within 30 days  from  today,  they
      would be provided a fresh opportunity of hearing.  However, it is  too
      early to anticipate as what order would be passed on their objections.
       In case, they are aggrieved by the order passed after  hearing  their
      objections, they have a statutory right to  approach  the  appropriate
      forum challenging the same.
      43.   In view of the above, we do not think it proper  to  decide  the
      cases on merits at such a premature  stage.   More  so,  there  is  no
      reason to believe that the authorities would act arbitrarily and would
      not take into consideration the grievance raised by the applicants.
      44.   In view of the above, Civil Appeal Nos.1542-44 of 2001,  1545-50
      of 2001 and 1551-56  of  2001  are  allowed.   The  judgment  impugned
      therein are set aside to the extent hereinabove.  Civil Appeal No.1864
      of 2014 and Transferred Case (C)  Nos.12-13  of  2010  are  dismissed.
      However, it is clarified that  any  observation  made  herein  in  the
      transferred cases would not adversely affect either  of  the  parties.
      No order as to costs.
                                          ….....…….……………………..J.
                                      (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)




                                                   .......……………………………J.
                                                   (J. CHELAMESWAR)




                                                   .......……………………………J.
    New Delhi,                                      (M.Y. EQBAL)
    May 9, 2014