Tuesday, January 31, 2017

30 activists booked for forcing ‘corrupt’ civic official to eat currency notes in Ahmedabad

In a bizzare in cident in Gujarat, an official of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was forced to eat currency notes by activists of a local NGO. Alleging the officials to be corrupt, the activists made the official eat notes laced with pickles in front of TV cameras. The Police had registered an FIR against 30 activists of the ‘Lok Rakshak Seva Samiti’ after the incident got telecasted in some local channels.
On the complaint by the victim Dharmin Vyas, assistant manager with professional tax department of AMC’s New West Zone, Vastrapur police registered an FIR against 30-odd activists of `Lok Rakshak Seva Samiti’. President of the NGO Pruthvi Bhatt was arrested on the charges of rioting and assaulting a government officer on duty, said inspector B J Sarvaiya.
“Vyas alleged that Bhatt and other activists, including women, storme to eat currency notes laced with pickle. When he resisted, Bhatt and others forcibly opened his mouth and manhandled him. Bhatt was arrested immediately,” said Sarvaiya.

Monday, January 30, 2017

Parents of girls who elope abuse habeas corpus: High Court

Gujarat high court has strongly condemned the misuse of habeas corpus petition by parents of daughters who elope with their lovers against the wishes of their elders.

The HC deplored the practice of petitioners activating the police mechanism through a habeas corpus petition, to find the girl and secure her "presence in a remote hope that by some means, the girl will change her mind".

Most habeas corpus petitions, which is the most important and serious of all litigations, are filed to trace girls who have eloped with their boyfriends.

In this case, filed by a resident of Kheda, his 27-year-old divorced daughter, left her parental home last year for her 37-year-old married boyfriend, who is a father of four.

The girl's family could not bear this also because the man belonged to another caste. The family tried its best to convince her to return, but the girl always refused to see them.

As a final shot, her father filed a habeas corpus petition in the high court and complained that his daughter was forcibly and illegally detained by the man, who does not allow her to move freely.

Since there were allegations of illegal detention, the HC ordered police to secure the girl's presence before the court.


The girl informed the HC that she moved to her boyfriend's home more than a year ago. She even published an advertisement in a local daily in December 2016, declaring her intentions about her stay.


Though she had made her choice amply clear by a public notice, her father chose to file habeas corpus and falsely claims that she was forcibly detained. She asserted her wish to return and continue to live with her boyfriend.



The HC dismissed the habeas corpus petition on the grounds that the girl is 27 years old and has a BA and BEd. She is mature and has freedom of movement.


"We are not concerned about the morality or even legality of her action," the HC said and criticized the filing of habeas corpus petitions to take a chance on whether a girl will change her mind and return to her parents.

Sunday, January 29, 2017

EC orders FIR against Arvind Kejriwal for poll bribe comments

The Election Commission (EC) today ordered that an FIR be filed against AAP chief Arvind Kejriwal for his comments about bribes at a rally in poll-bound Goa earlier this month.

The EC also said today that a compliance report regarding legal action on Kejriwal must be sent to it by 3.00 PM , January 31, at the latest.

The EC already scolded the Delhi chief minister on January 21 for "asking Goa voters to accept bribes" from those political parties that are offering it, but vote only for AAP. At the January 8 rally, the Delhi chief minister also told the voters to ask for Rs 10,000 when offered Rs 5,000 by workers of rival parties and to accept only new currency notes.

The EC said his comments were an exhortation to accept bribes. It added that if he doesn't stop making such statements, it would derecognise AAP.

The Delhi CM sees it as quite the opposite - his remarks are actually to do with stemming corruption and bribery, he thinks. Being asked to not say what he did amounts to saying, 'Accept bribes and vote for the person who bribed you," Kejriwal believes. That is akin to promoting bribes, he thinks .

Saturday, January 28, 2017

Gujarat high court quashes charge of aiding fugitive against doctor

 Gujarat high court has come to the rescue of a government doctor, who was charge-sheeted for harbouring a criminal as he had advised him strict bed rest due to his medical condition.

Justice J B Pardiwala quashed criminal proceedings pending in a Jamnagar court against Dr Nehal Shah, who was posted with Guru Gobindsingh Government Hospital in 2010.

According to case details, former MP Vikram Madam's nephew Vishal Madam was arrested in connection with a murder case in 2010. After his arrest, when he was in judicial custody, Madam was brought to the hospital after he complained of having pain in his knees. An MRI was conducted on him. The doctor prescribed treatment and advised him to strict bed rest for six weeks.

Dr Shah's treatment and decision to keep Madam in hospital did not go down well with police, who booked the doctor for harbouring charges under Section 212 of the IPC and a criminal trial began against him.

The doctor rushed to the high court urging for quashing of the charges, but the state government opposed and maintained that Madam's illness was fabricated. The government said the doctor was Madam's close friend, and had tried to help Madam in a way by keeping him in hospital. Madam was absolutely fine and he had no problem in his knee joint. The medical case papers the doctor had prepared were incorrect, the government had said.

After hearing the arguments, the high court quashed to proceedings against the doctor on the ground that the charges of harbouring can be invoked when an offender is given shelter and shield from law and punishment. But in this case, Madam was already arrested and in custody. There can be no harbouring of an accused person when under arrest.

The high court, however, permitted the state government to invoke the charges if any evidence with regard to the MRI report appeared during the course of trial. The government can request the trial court to arraign the doctor in criminal proceedings as an accused, if any evidence against him is found during the trial, said the high court

Thursday, January 26, 2017

Rape survivor's statement recorded before magistrate

One week after the case of the 14-year-old learning impaired girl who was allegedly raped and subjected to unnatural sex emerged, police recorded her statement under section 164 of CrPC before a magistrate. Cops said the girl stated that she was raped by five persons and then thrown on the streets of Ahmedabad from a car.
Crime branch officials said they have identified suspects on the basis of the girl's statement. `The test identification parade of suspects could be held on Thursday before the concerned magistrate," a senior crime branch official added.
According to police sources, the girl who is being treated at VS hospital, was taken to court to get her statement recorded under section 164 of CrPC. "With no material evidence, we have to rely on the statement of the girl and hence got it recorded under section164," a police official said.
The girl was first found by Childline on December 28 and admitted to Civil Hospital. "According to hospital authorities, she escaped and was then found by one Mahnoor Saiyed outside Civil Hospital on December 30, 2016," a police source said.
District collector Avantika Singh said she had sent district child protection officers to take stock of the situation. "We have arranged for a shelter for the rape survivor with an NGO. The NGO has a medical facilities and the girl will be treated there," added Singh.

Malaysian woman alleges rape by facebook friend

An interaction on Facebook turned out to be a nightmare for a Malaysian woman, who has alleged that a man raped, cheated and had unnatural sex with her on the pretext of marriage. Following the police investigation, a court has framed charges against the man for rape, unnatural sex and cheating.

The woman alleged that she made several trips to India following the promise of marriage and even paid the accused in Malaysian ringgits amounting to lakhs of rupees after he promised to marry her, get her an Indian citizenship and accept her child from a previous marriage.

Realising that he had taken physical and financial advantage, the woman filed a complaint with the police following which additional sessions judge Ramesh Kumar-II framed the charges under IPC Sections 376 (2) (n) (raping a woman repeatedly), 377 (unnatural sex) and 420 (cheating).

In her complaint, the woman alleged that she was in touch with the man on Facebook from September 2015 to May 2016. She also came to India and during her 15-day stay in the city, developed physical relations with the man believing he would marry her. "Not only this, the accused also made a video recording" and clicked her nude photos, the complaint alleged.

Senior public prosecutor AT Ansari highlighted the allegations made in the woman's complaint which alleged that the man kept making excuses that he was trying to convince his family as theirs was going to be an inter-faith marriage.

Besides 20,000 ringgits (Rs 3.2 lakh) given by the woman to the man for accommodation, she again gave 1,800 ringgits (Rs 30,000) as he assured an Indian citizenship and registration of marriage. She, however, went back as none of what had been promised happened. On her return, the woman alleged, the man obtained her signature on a blank piece of paper and she also paid 15,000 ringgits (Rs 2.4 lakh) and gave two diamond-studded gold rings.

The woman kept transferring money to the man from time to time, but on realising that she was "cheated, exploited and physically abused" got a complaint registered with the police.

Tuesday, January 24, 2017

Gujarat’s Haji Ali: PIL for entry of women in Patan’s shrine

Inspired by success of women in gaining entry to Mumbai's Haji Ali Dargah's sanctum, two women have taken up a similar issue and demanded that women and girls should be permitted to enter in the sanctum of Hazrat Maulana Mehbub ki Dargah in the north Gujarat town of Patan.

Denied entry to women in the shrine's sanctum, the two petitioners - Deepika Shinde and Alfia Lacewala have filed a public interest litigation in Gujarat high court seeking directions to all concerned authorities to allow women to enter the shrine so that they too can worship and perform rituals.


Citing constitutional provisions that guarantee equality and freedom to practice and propagate religion, the petitioners have based their arguments on Bombay high court's historic verdict passed last year permitting women to enter Mumbai's Haji Ali Dargah, where the trust had prohibited women's entry to its sanctum.


The petitioners have submitted that they had been consistently requesting authorities and concerned trust in this regard. They were making representations before the state government, Patan district collector, mamlatdar, Gujarat Wakf Board, and the trust that manages the shrine and its caretaker, Jamaluddin Faruki, for last eight months.
When there was no response from concerned authorities, the petitioners filed a PIL making all concerned authorities party-respondents in the litigation. The high court is likely to take up the matter on Wednesday.


The trust that manages Hazrat Maulana Mehbub Dargah and the graveyard alongside gathered a controversy a few years ago. Interestingly, the trust was headed earlier by a woman. In 2011, following a dispute, the Wakf Board had prohibited entry of the present caretaker to the shrine. Government authorities took up the administration and the shrine was locked. The high court was then moved by the trust for removal of the lock so that followers could worship and perform rituals at the place.

Monday, January 23, 2017

IL&FS disqualified from bidding for Guj project

The National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) has disqualified infrastructure major IL&FS for a Rs 1,200 crore highway project in Gujarat this month citing “potential conflict of interest“.The company has retired IAS officer R C Sinha as a non-executive independent director, who is also the adviser to highways minister Nitin Gadkari.Sinha holds this honorary post as he does not take any salary , though he has office and staff at his disposal at Transport Bhawan.NHAI also bears expenses on his stay when he is in Delhi.
National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) has disqualified infrastructure major IL&FS for a Rs 1,200 crore highway project in Gujarat this month citing “potential conflict of interest“.
The company has retired IAS officer R C Sinha as a nonexecutive independent director, who is also the adviser to highways minister Nitin Gadkari. Sinha holds this honorary post as he does not take any salary , though he has office and staff at his disposal at Transport Bhawan. NHAI also bears expenses on his stay when he is in Delhi.
This is the second time that NHAI has disqualified companies on the same ground in less than a year for the same 93km highway project of NH-8. Last year NHAI had issued work order to Overseas Infrastructure Alliance and KMC Constructions for this project. But later it had found that Sinha was director and chairman of OIA, which was a clear case of conflict of inter est, officials said. Sources said the matter was referred to NHAI board, which has representatives from different ministries, and NHAI chairman was authorised to take a call.The contract was cancelled.
TOI has learnt that when the matter came before highways minister Nitin Gadkari, he had asked Sinha that he needed to make a choice between working with OIA and holding the honorary post in the ministry. Sinha resigned from the company in October . A statement issue by the company on October 1 said, “OIA 's director and chairman, Dr R C Sinha has stepped down from his position on the board with effect from October 1, 2016 to pursue his personal interests and commitments.“ Sources said while IL&FS has raised its concern with NHAI suspecting that the authority may use the same ground not to open their bids, Sinha has also written to Gadkari to end the “confusion“ over conflict of interest since he does not take a single `paisa' from government as salary.He has cited how NHAI was not opening bids of IL&FS.
Sinha did not respond to calls and SMS till the report was filed. Meanwhile, officials said Gadkari is likely to suggest Sinha make the choice between IL&FS and the honorary post he holds with his ministry.



Saturday, January 21, 2017

Educated girl can't cry rape if ditched by BF: HC

A promise to marry cannot be considered an inducement in every rape case, the Bombay high court has ruled while granting pre-arrest bail to a 21-year-old youth after his former girlfriend lodged a case of rape following their break-up. Justice Mridula Bhatkar held that an educated girl who has consented to have pre-marital sex should take responsibility for her decision.

"In the event of consent obtained by fraud, inducement is a necessary ingredient. There should be some material on record to believe prima facie that the girl was induced to such an extent that she was ready to have sexual intercourse. Promise to marry cannot be said to be an inducement in these types of cases," said Justice Bhatkar.

The judge said that though society was changing, it carries the baggage of morality. "Since generations, there is a moral taboo that it is the responsibility of a woman to be a virgin at the time of marriage. However, today, the young generation is exposed to different interactions with each other and is well informed about sexual activities. Society is trying to be liberated but carries baggage of different notions of morality wherein sex before marriage is a matter of censure. Under such circumstances, a woman who is in love with a boy forgets that to have sex is her option like her counterpart's but refuses to take responsibility for her decision."

The court pointed to the rising trend of criminal prosecutions for rape initiated after the end of the relationship and said that the court needs to take an objective view and balance the life and liberty of the accused with the sufferings of the girl.

It cited its earlier orders where it had held that when a woman is an adult and educated, she is supposed to know the consequences of a pre-marital sexual relationship.

Thursday, January 19, 2017

Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Salem) Ltd V/s Chinnadurai 02.06.2016

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

Reserved on   :27.04.2016

Pronounced on  :02.06.2016

CORAM

The Hon'ble Mr.Justice M.V.MURALIDARAN

CRP (PD) No.1343 of 2012
and
M.P.No.1 of 2012

The Managing Director,
Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Salem) Ltd.,
Bharathipuram,
Dharmapuri 05.
  .. Petitioner  
Versus

Chinnadurai
              .. Respondent 


PRAYER:  Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, praying against the order dated 07.03.2012, made in R.E.P.No.146/2010 in M.C.O.P.No.879/2006, on the file of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Dharmapuri.

For Petitioner                    ...Ms.D.Venkatachalam


For Respondent                 ...Mr.T.Pappaiah Dharmarajan
   
               



O R D E R

'Life' does not mean a mere animal existence and this term occuring in Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been expounded and expanded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and this Court in a long line of decisions and we have travelled a long way from Gopalan to Gandhi (A.K.Gopalan's case AIR 1950 SC 27) to (Menaka Gandhi's case AIR 1978 SC 597).

2.  Motor Vehicle Accidents are on the rise everyday due to numerous reasons and loss of life and bodily injury in accident case is ever increasing and the victim can never be restored back to his original shape and live his life normally after he suffers an accident.  For this kind of a suffering, the only solace the law can offer to him is payment of compensation.

3.  The Courts are also cautious in matters of grant of compensation in Motor Accident cases and generally do not adopt a narrow, pedentic or hyper-technical approach.  It is an unwritten norm that in cases of grant of compensation, the Courts have to be liberal and understand the difficulties of the vicim and compensate him appropriately so that he or his family could limp their way back to a normal life, though not entirely possible.

4.  The term 'Compensation' has been explained in R.Ramanatha Aiyar law dictionary refering to Blacks Law dictionary as:
An act which a Court orders to be done, or money which a Court orders to be paid, by a person whose acts or omissions have caused loss or injury to another in order that thereby the person damnified may receive equal value for his loss, or be made whole in respect of his injury; remuneration or satisfaction for injury or damage of every description; remuneration for loss of time, necessary expenditures and for permanent disability if such be the result; remuneration for the injury directly and proximately caused by a breach of contract or duty; remuneration or wages given to an employee or officer.

5.  The scope of this term has been construed differently in various enactments to convey the meaning that compensation is offered as a solace for a loss suffered by the individual.   The purpose of granting compensation in Motor Accident cases as it is already been stated previously is to ensure that the victim or his family is restituted for the great suffering on account of the accident.

6.  Whether it would be appropriate to insist the victim who is awarded compensation to part with it or the interest that accrued on it towards payment as Tax Deduction at Source (TDS) as under the Income Tax Act 1961?.  This is a crucial and important question that arises for consideration and this Court intends to clarify on this matter further as the same would have serious implications.

7.  Before doing so, it is necessary to look into the facts of the present case on hand.  The Respondent in the instant Revision Petiion has filed an Execution Petition R.E.P.No.146 of 2010 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Dharmapuri in M.C.O.P.No.879 of 2006 wherein the amount that they are entitled to Rs.4,23,271/- and in the memo filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rs.24,017/- has been deducted for TDS.  R.E.P.No.146 of 2010 that has been filed was allowed by the Court below and accordingly, the bus belonging to the Revision Petitioner Corporation was attached and the Corporation was directed to deposit the balance amount of Rs.30,774.  Aggrieved by this order, the Petitioner has approached this Court and when the matter came up on an earlier occasion before this Court an Order dated 20.04.2012, was passed and wherein it has been directed as follows:
The petitioner Transport Corporation shall deposit the amount, which was not earlier deposited, to the credit of M.C.O.P.No.879 of 2006, on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Dharmapuri, without prejudice to their contention and the Tribunal is directed not to release that much portion of the disputed amount, pending C.R.P.  The remaining amount can be released in favour of the judgment holder, as per law.  However, on such deposit, the vehicle, namely the bus, shall be released .

8.  Mr.Venkatachalam, learned counsel for the Petitioner would submit that as per Sections 194-A and 156 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the interest portion awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal should be subject to TDS and accordingly stated that the deduction was justified and to canvass his case, he relied upon two judgments of different High Courts and a judgment of this Court.


9.  The first judgment that was relied is that of a Single Judge of the High Court of Chattisgarh reported in CDJ 2015 Ch HC 110 and the second was that of a Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka reported in CDJ 2015 Kar HC 532 and thirdly, a decision of a Single Judge of this Court in CDJ 2004 NHC 1575.  In all of the above three judgments, it has been held by the Courts that whenever the compensation amount earns interest by reason of delayed payment or otherwise, it is liable to TDS and the exemption could be claimedonly by way of filing the necessary returns before the assessing authority.  Hence, on the basis of the above said judgments, the Counsel for the Petitioner prayed that the Revision be allowed.

10.  On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent, Mr.Pappaiah Dharmarajan would submit that order of the Court below is well reasoned and justified and accordingly prayed that the instant revision petition be dismissed.

11.  Therefore, reverting to the legal issue involved in the present matter, it has to be answered as to whether the deduction of TDS on interest accrued on deposits in terms of Orders passed by the Courts in Motor Accident cases is legally sustainable or not?.  To simply say yes to the above question, I could very well follow the judgments cited by the Revision Petitioner and conclude the matter.

12.  But, this Court does not choose to do the same, since the issue at hand is of larger public interest and have far reaching implications.  As stated earlier, if the law has to be interpreted so technically and rigidly whereby which a family of an individual who could have possibly lost his life or limbs in an accident has to pay TDS on the interest that has accrued on the compensation amount, will the law be doing a service or disservice to the victims?.  With all due respect, I find that the three decisions cited by the Petitioner does not deal with this issue at all.

13.  The question is whether the provisions of the Income Tax Act 1961, and more specifically, whether the compensation awarded  by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to the victim can be classified as a taxable income under the Income Tax law?.  The answer to this question in the opinion of this Court is in the negative.  Compensation cannot be categorized or even described as income as it has already been stated that the intention of the legislature in awarding compensation to the victims of Motor Accident cases is to restitute them and rehabilitate them.

14.  The Income Tax Department appears to have issued a circular dated 14.10.2011 whereby deduction of Income Tax has been ordered on the award amount and the interest accrued on the deposits made under the order of the Court in Motor Accident Cases.  Taking serious view of this circular, the Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court took Suo-Moto cognizance of the matter and considered the same as a Public Interest Litigation in the judgment reported in Court on its Motion Vs. H.P.State Co-operative Bank Ltd & Ors 2014 SCC Online HP 4273 and has quashed the circular and in an elaborate and well considered judgment, His Lordship the Hon'ble Chief Justice Mansoor Ahmed Mir has held that:

13.While going through the said provisions of law, one comes to the inescapable conclusion that the mandate of the said provisions does not apply to the accident claim cases and the compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be said to be taxable income.  The compensation is awarded in lieu of death of a person or bodily injury suffered in a vehicular accident, which is damage and not income.
14.  Chapters X and XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for grant of compensation to the victims of a vehicular accident.  The Motor Vehicles Act has undergone a sea change and the purpose of granting compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is to ameliorate the sufferings of the victims so that they may be saved from social evils and starvation, and that the victims get some sort of help as early as possible.  It is just to save them from sufferings, agony and to rehabilitate them.   We wonder how and under what provisions of law the Income Tax Authorities have treated the amount awarded or interest accrued on term deposits made in Motor Accident Claims Cases as income.  Therefore, the said Circular is against the concept and provisions referred to hereinabove and runs contrary to the mandate of granting compensation.

...23.  Having said so, the Circular, dated 14.10.2011, issued by the Income Tax Authorities, whereby deduction of income Tax has been ordered on the award amount and interest accred on the deposits made under the orders of the Court in Motor Accident Claims Cases, is quashed and in case any such deduction has been made by respondents, they are directed to refund the same, with interest at the rate of 12% from the date of deduction till payment, within six weeks from today .

15.  Following the Division Bench Judgment, a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in a recent decision, in New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs.Sudesh Chawla and others, CR.No.430 of 2015 (O&M), reiterating the reasoning given by the Division Bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court, has opined that award of compensation is on the principle of restitution to place the claimant in the same position in which he would have been loss of life or injury has not been suffered and accordinly held that the orders calling upon the Insurance Company to pay TDS/deduct Tds on the interest part are not sustainable.

16.  If we look at other jurisdictions like Australia, Unites States and United Kingdom, even there, the matters where a person has suffered an injury or there has been a loss of life and a compensation has been paid in lieu of that, then it has been held by the Courts that there cannot be any Tax deduction on such compensation.  The underlying basis behind this is that a person who suffers a loss cannot be asked to part with the solatium he receives since it is the only remedy he has been provided with by the law.

17.  If there is a conflict between a social welfare legislation and a taxation legislation, then, this Court is of the view that a social welfare legislation should prevail since it subserves larger public interest.  The Motor Vehicle Act is one such legislation which has been passed with a benevolent intention for compensating the accidient victims who have suffered bodily disablement or loss of life and the Income Tax Act which is primarily intended for Tax collection by the State cannot put spokes in the effective and efficacious enforcement of the Motor Vehicles Act.  In fact, if one might deeply analyse, it could be seen that there is no direct conflict between any provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Motor Vehicles Act and it is only by the interpretation of the provisions the concept of compulsory payment of TDS has crept into the realm of compensation payment in Motor Vehicle Accident cases.


18.  Hence, with due respect I am unable to concur with the findings of the Karnataka High Court, the Chattisgarh High Court and this Court cited by the Revision Petitioner.  This Court is of the view that the Division Bench judgment of the Himachal Pradesh high Court and the judgment of the Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court lay down the right law and hence, this Court arrives at the conclusion that the compensation awarded or the interest accruing therein from the compensation that has been awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal cannot be subjected to TDS and the same cannot be insisted to be paid to the Tax Authorities since the compensation and the interest awarded therein does not fall under the term 'income' as defined under the Income Tax Act, 1961.

19.  Therefore, this Court directs that the Petitioner Corporation cannot deduct any amount towards TDS and the same shall also be deposited in addition to the amount that has already been deposited to the credit of M.C.O.P.No.879 of 2006, on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Dharmapuri, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and the Respondent is entitled to take appropriate steps in a manner known to law to withdraw the amount.

20.  Accordinly, the above Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.   No costs.  Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.


02.06.2016

Index:Yes/No
Internet:Yes/No
ub

To
The  Additional District Judge,
 Fast Track Court,
Dharmapuri.

M.V.MURALIDARAN, J.
ub


PRE-DELIVERY ORDER MADE IN
C.R.P(PD)No.1343 of 2012


02.06.2016

Compensation awarded by MACT not ‘income’ and cannot be subjected to TDS and Income Tax: Madras HC

FULL JUDGEMENT
In a very significant judgment, the Madras High Court has held that the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) to accident victims cannot be subjected to TDS and Income Tax since the compensation and the interest awarded therein does not fall under the term ‘income’ as defined under the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Referring to a Himachal Pradesh High Court judgment wherein it had quashed circular issued by Income Tax Department  ordering deduction of Income Tax the award amount and the interest accrued on the deposits made under the order of the Court in Motor Accident Cases, Justice M.V.Muralidaran said that purpose of granting compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is to ameliorate the sufferings of the victims so that they may be saved from social evils and starvation, and that the victims get some sort of help as early as possible.

The Court said “if the law has to be interpreted so technically and rigidly whereby which a family of an individual who could have possibly lost his life or limbs in an accident has to pay TDS on the interest that has accrued on the compensation amount, will the law be doing a service or disservice to the victims?”

SOCIAL WELFARE LEGISLATION TO PREVAIL IF IT IS CONFLICT WITH TAXATION LEGISLATION

The Court further observed “If there is a conflict between a social welfare legislation and a taxation legislation, then, this Court is of the view that a social welfare legislation should prevail since it subserves larger public interest. The Motor Vehicle Act is one such legislation which has been passed with a benevolent intention for compensating the accident victims who have suffered bodily disablement or loss of life and the Income Tax Act which is primarily intended for Tax collection by the State cannot put spokes in the effective and efficacious enforcement of the Motor Vehicles Act. In fact, if one might deeply analyse, it could be seen that there is no direct conflict between any provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Motor Vehicles Act and it is only by the interpretation of the provisions the concept of compulsory payment of TDS has crept into the realm of compensation payment in Motor Vehicle Accident cases.”

The Court added that there is no direct conflict between any provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Motor Vehicles Act and it is only by the interpretation of the provisions the concept of compulsory payment of TDS has crept into the realm of compensation payment in Motor Vehicle Accident cases.

COMPENSATION IS NOT INCOME

Rejecting the contention that, compensation is to be treated as income, the Court held “Compensation cannot be categorized or even described as income as it has already been stated that the intention of the legislature in awarding compensation to the victims of Motor Accident cases is to restitute them and rehabilitate them.”

The Court further remarked “The Motor Vehicles Act has undergone a sea change and the purpose of granting compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is to ameliorate the sufferings of the victims so that they may be saved from social evils and starvation, and that the victims get some sort of help as early as possible. It is just to save them from sufferings, agony and to rehabilitate them. We wonder how and under what provisions of law the Income Tax Authorities have treated the amount awarded or interest accrued on term deposits made in Motor Accident Claims Cases as income.”

Referring to laws of foreign countries, the Court said “If we look at other jurisdictions like Australia, Unites States and United Kingdom, even there, the matters where a person has suffered an injury or there has been a loss of life and a compensation has been paid in lieu of that, then it has been held by the Courts that there cannot be any Tax deduction on such compensation. The underlying basis behind this is that a person who suffers a loss cannot be asked to part with the solatium he receives since it is the only remedy he has been provided with by the law.”

RADHA KRISHNA & ANR. v. GOKUL & ORS. [2013] INSC 1000 (31 October 2013)

NON-REPORTABLE 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9858 OF 2013 
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 1056 of 2008) 

Radhakrishna and another ....Appellants 
versus 
Gokul and others ....Respondents

G.S. SINGHVI, J.

1. Leave granted.
2. Feeling dissatisfied with the meagre enhancement of Rs.8,000 granted by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the amount of compensation determined by Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Barwaha (West), Nimar (for short, ‘the Tribunal’), the appellants have filed this appeal.
3. Nilesh (son of the appellants) was killed in a road accident, which occurred on 20.1.2003, when the motorcycle on which he was going along with his friend Rohit was hit by the truck belonging to respondent No.1.
4. The appellants filed a petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’) for award of compensation to the tune of Rs.50,60,000. Their claim was founded on the following assertions:
(i) The accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the truck owned by respondent No.1, which was insured with respondent No.3 – United India Insurance Co.
(ii) At the time of accident, the deceased was 19 years old and he was a student of degree course in Engineering.
(iii) After completion of study, the deceased was expected to get a good job as an Engineer and earn substantial salary.
5. In the written statement filed by them, the owner and the driver (respondent Nos. 1 and 2) claimed that the truck was duly insured with respondent No.3 and the compensation, if any, was payable by respondent No.3. In a separate statement, respondent No.3 denied its liability by asserting that the driver of the truck and the motorcyclist did not have valid driving licences. It was further pleaded that the appellants are not entitled to compensation because the deceased was travelling as a pillion rider.
6. On the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues:
â€Å“1. Whether the Resp-2 by driving the truck No. MP-11A/2453 in rash & negligent manner caused the accident with the motor cycle No. MP 10 D 42/4 driven by Resp-4 coming from opposite direction?
2. Whether the pillion rider on the motor cycle, i.e., the son of applicants Nilesh died due to physical injuries received in the said accident?
3. Whether the truck No. MP/11A/2454 was being driven in violation of Insurance policy & provision of the M.V. Act at the time of accident, If yes its effect?
4. Whether the motor cycle No. MP 10 D 4214 was being driven in violation of Insurance policy & provision of M.V. Act? If Yes, its effect?
5. Whether the applicant is entitled to get compensation. If yes, what amount and from whom?
6. Relief and Cost.”
7. After analyzing the evidence produced by the parties, the Tribunal answered issues No.1 to 4 in favour of the appellants. While dealing with the issue relating to the quantum of compensation, the Tribunal referred to the statement of appellant No.1 Radhakrishna Soni and the documents produced by him and observed:
â€Å“The age of Nilesh is stated to be 19 years by the applicant at the time of accident which is supported by school record. As the deceased was studying at the time of death, his probable income can be determined at Rs.15,000/- p.a. from which 1/3 is deducted for the annual dependency of the applicants. It is proper to apply 17 multiplier keeping in view the age of the deceased. Accordingly the total dependency amount is Rs.10,000x17=Rs.1,70,000. Due to the untimely death of son the applicant are deprived from love & affection of son. So each applicant is entitled to Rs.10,000 is the annual dependency of the applicants. It is proper to apply 17 multiplier keeping in view the age of the deceased Rs.1,70,000. Apart from this Rs.2000/- is awarded for funeral expenses. Thus the grand total compensation of the applicants is Rs.1,92,000/- entitled to get from Res 1-3 jointly or separately.”
8. The appellants challenged the award of the Tribunal by filing an appeal under Section 173 of the Act but could not persuade the High Court to grant substantial enhancement in the amount of compensation and the appeal was disposed of with a direction to respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to pay additional compensation of Rs.8,000 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
For deciding the question whether the appellants are entitled to higher compensation, it will be useful to notice some of the precedents. In Sarla Verma v. D.T.C. (2009) 6 SCC 121, a two-Judge Bench of this Court took cognizance of the lack of uniformity and consistency in awarding compensation to the victims of accidents caused by motor vehicles, referred to the judgments in U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Trilok Chandra [1996] INSC 666(1996) 4 SCC 362, G.M., Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas [1993] INSC 2(1994) 2 SCC 176 and made the following observations:
â€Å“Assessment of compensation though involving certain hypothetical considerations, should nevertheless be objective.
Justice and justness emanate from equality in treatment, consistency and thoroughness in adjudication, and fairness and uniformity in the decision-making process and the decisions.
While it may not be possible to have mathematical precision or identical awards in assessing compensation, same or similar facts should lead to awards in the same range. When the factors/inputs are the same, and the formula/legal principles are the same, consistency and uniformity, and not divergence and freakiness, should be the result of adjudication to arrive at just compensation. In Susamma Thomas [1993] INSC 2(1994) 2 SCC 176, this Court stated:
â€Å“16. … The proper method of computation is the multiplier method. Any departure, except in exceptional and extraordinary cases, would introduce inconsistency of principle, lack of uniformity and an element of unpredictability, for the assessment of compensation.” Basically only three facts need to be established by the claimants for assessing compensation in the case of death:
(a) age of the deceased;
(b) income of the deceased; and (c) the number of dependants.
The issues to be determined by the Tribunal to arrive at the loss of dependency are:
(i) additions/deductions to be made for arriving at the income;
(ii) the deduction to be made towards the personal living expenses of the deceased; and (iii) the multiplier to be applied with reference to the age of the deceased.
If these determinants are standardised, there will be uniformity and consistency in the decisions. There will be lesser need for detailed evidence. It will also be easier for the insurance companies to settle accident claims without delay.
To have uniformity and consistency, the Tribunals should determine compensation in cases of death, by the following well- settled steps:
Step 1 (Ascertaining the multiplicand) The income of the deceased per annum should be determined. Out of the said income a deduction should be made in regard to the amount which the deceased would have spent on himself by way of personal and living expenses. The balance, which is considered to be the contribution to the dependant family, constitutes the multiplicand.
Step 2 (Ascertaining the multiplier) Having regard to the age of the deceased and period of active career, the appropriate multiplier should be selected. This does not mean ascertaining the number of years he would have lived or worked but for the accident. Having regard to several imponderables in life and economic factors, a table of multipliers with reference to the age has been identified by this Court. The multiplier should be chosen from the said table with reference to the age of the deceased.
Step 3 (Actual calculation) The annual contribution to the family (multiplicand) when multiplied by such multiplier gives the â€Å“loss of dependency” to the family.
Thereafter, a conventional amount in the range of Rs 5000 to Rs 10,000 may be added as loss of estate. Where the deceased is survived by his widow, another conventional amount in the range of 5000 to 10,000 should be added under the head of loss of consortium. But no amount is to be awarded under the head of pain, suffering or hardship caused to the legal heirs of the deceased.
The funeral expenses, cost of transportation of the body (if incurred) and cost of any medical treatment of the deceased before death (if incurred) should also be added.” The Bench then considered the question whether there should be addition to the income for future prospects and observed:
â€Å“In view of the imponderables and uncertainties, we are in favour of adopting as a rule of thumb, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the actual salary income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below 40 years. (Where the annual income is in the taxable range, the words â€Å“actual salary” should be read as â€Å“actual salary less tax”). The addition should be only 30% if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50 years. There should be no addition, where the age of the deceased is more than 50 years.
Though the evidence may indicate a different percentage of increase, it is necessary to standardise the addition to avoid different yardsticks being applied or different methods of calculation being adopted. Where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary (without provision for annual increments, etc.), the courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death. A departure therefrom should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances.” The next issue considered by the Bench was whether there should be deduction for personal and living expenses. After noticing some precedents, the Bench observed:
â€Å“.......... Having considered several subsequent decisions of this Court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of dependent family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (1/5th) where the number of dependent family members exceeds six.
Where the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants are the parents, the deduction follows a different principle. In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in a short time, in which event the contribution to the parent(s) and siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will not be considered as a dependant and the mother alone will be considered as a dependant. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependants, because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be dependent on the father.
Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents and siblings, only the mother would be considered to be a dependant, and 50% would be treated as the personal and living expenses of the bachelor and 50% as the contribution to the family. However, where the family of the bachelor is large and dependent on the income of the deceased, as in a case where he has a widowed mother and large number of younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses may be restricted to one-third and contribution to the family will be taken as two- third.” Finally, the complex issue relating to application of multiplier was examined and decided in the following words:
â€Å“We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in Column (4) of the table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas [1993] INSC 2(1994) 2 SCC 176, Trilok Chandra [1996] INSC 666(1996) 4 SCC 362 and Charlie (2005) 10 SCC 720), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.”
10. However, the issue relating to award of compensation to the parents of the deceased, who was a student was neither dealt with nor decided in Sarla Verma’s case. In Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (2001) 8 SCC 197, a three-Judge Bench of this Court entertained a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution for ordering prosecution of the officers of the Tata Iron and Steel Company and their agents and servants for the alleged negligence in organizing a function at Jamshedpur in which 60 people were killed due to fire accident and for issue of a direction to the State Government as well as the company to pay compensation to the victims.
For assessing the compensation payable to the victims, this Court requested the former Chief Justice Shri Y.V. Chandrachud to examine the matter and submit a report. The first part of the report submitted by Shri Justice Y.V. Chandrachud dealt with the cases of death and the second part dealt with the cases of burn injury. After taking cognizance of three judgments of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Chairman, A.P. SRTC v.
Shafiya Khatoon 1985 ACJ 212, Bhagwan Das v. Mohd. Arif 1987 ACJ 1052 and A.P. SRTC v. G. Ramanaiah 1988 ACJ 223 and the views of the British Law Commission wherein adoption of the multiplier method was advocated and approved, Justice Chandrachud took the contribution of children above 10 years of age at Rs.12,000 per annum, applied multiplier of 11 and suggested award of conventional amount of Rs.25,000. After considering the arguments of Ms. Rani Jethmalani and Shri F.S. Nariman, learned counsel for the parties, this Court directed payment of higher compensation. While dealing with the cases of children, the Court observed as under:
â€Å“So far as the award of compensation in case of children is concerned, Shri Justice Chandrachud has divided them into two groups, the first group between the age group of 5 to 10 years and the second group between the age group of 10 to 15 years. In case of children between the age group of 5 to 10 years, a uniform sum of Rs 50,000 has been held to be payable by way of compensation, to which the conventional figure of Rs 25,000 has been added and as such to the heirs of the 14 children, a consolidated sum of Rs 75,000 each, has been awarded. So far as the children in the age group of 10 to 15 years, there are 10 such children who died on the fateful day and having found their contribution to the family at Rs 12,000 per annum, 11 multiplier has been applied, particularly, depending upon the age of the father and then the conventional compensation of Rs 25,000 has been added to each case and consequently, the heirs of each of the deceased above 10 years of age, have been granted compensation to the tune of Rs 1,57,000 each. In case of the death of an infant, there may have been no actual pecuniary benefit derived by its parents during the child's lifetime. But this will not necessarily bar the parents' claim and prospective loss will found a valid claim provided that the parents establish that they had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit if the child had lived. This principle was laid down by the House of Lords in the famous case of Taff Vale Rly. v.
Jenkins and Lord Atkinson said thus:
â€Å“… all that is necessary is that a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit should be entertained by the person who sues. It is quite true that the existence of this expectation is an inference of fact — there must be a basis of fact from which the inference can reasonably be drawn;
but I wish to express my emphatic dissent from the proposition that it is necessary that two of the facts without which the inference cannot be drawn are, first, that the deceased earned money in the past, and, second, that he or she contributed to the support of the plaintiff.
These are, no doubt, pregnant pieces of evidence, but they are only pieces of evidence; and the necessary inference can, I think, be drawn from circumstances other than and different from them.” At the same time, it must be held that a mere speculative possibility of benefit is not sufficient. Question whether there exists a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage is always a mixed question of fact and law. There are several decided cases on this point, providing the guidelines for determination of compensation in such cases but we do not think it necessary for us to advert, as the claimants had not adduced any materials on the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits, which the parents expected. In case of a bright and healthy boy, his performances in the school, it would be easier for the authority to arrive at the compensation amount, which may be different from another sickly, unhealthy, rickety child and bad student, but as has been stated earlier, not an iota of material was produced before Shri Justice Chandrachud to enable him to arrive at a just compensation in such cases and, therefore, he has determined the same on an approximation. Mr Nariman, appearing for TISCO on his own, submitted that the compensation determined for the children of all age groups could be doubled, as in his views also, the determination made is grossly inadequate. Loss of a child to the parents is irrecoupable, and no amount of money could compensate the parents. Having regard to the environment from which these children were brought, their parents being reasonably well-placed officials of Tata Iron and Steel Company, and on considering the submission of Mr Nariman, we would direct that the compensation amount for the children between the age group of 5 to 10 years should be three times. In other words, it should be Rs 1.5 lakhs, to which the conventional figure of Rs 50,000 should be added and thus the total amount in each case would be Rs 2.00 lakhs. So far as the children between the age group of 10 to 15 years, they are all students of Class VI to Class X and are children of employees of TISCO. TISCO itself has a tradition that every employee can get one of his children employed in the Company. Having regard to these facts, in their case, the contribution of Rs 12,000 per annum appears to us to be on the lower side and in our considered opinion, the contribution should be Rs 24,000 and instead of 11 multiplier, the appropriate multiplier would be
15. Therefore, the compensation, so calculated on the aforesaid basis should be worked out to Rs 3.60 lakhs, to which an additional sum of Rs 50,000 has to be added, thus making the total amount payable at Rs 4.10 lakhs for each of the claimants of the aforesaid deceased children.”
11. In M.S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood (2001) 8 SCC 151, a two-Judge Bench considered issues of negligence resulting in death of 14 students of Dalhausie Public School. The students died due to drowning in River Beas.
After holding that the teachers of the school were negligent, the Court referred to the judgment in Lata Wadha̢۪s case as also the judgment in G.M., Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas (supra) and proceeded to observe:
â€Å“In Lata Wadhwa case however, this Court came to a conclusion that upon acceptability of the multiplier method and depending upon the fact situation, namely, the involvement of TISCO in its tradition that every employee can get one of his children employed in the Company and having regard to the multiplier 15 the compensation was calculated at Rs 3.60 lakhs with an additional sum of Rs 50,000 as a conventional figure making the total amount payable at Rs 4.10 lakhs for each of the claimants of the deceased children.
The decision in Lata Wadhwa thus, is definitely a guiding factor in the matter of award of compensation wherein children died due to an unfortunate incident as noticed more fully hereinbefore in this judgment.
Having considered the matter in its proper perspective and the applicability of the multiplier method and without even any further material on record, we do feel it expedient to note that though Mr Bahuguna attributed the quantum granted by the High Court as strangely absurd, we, however, are not in a position to lend our concurrence therewith. It is not that the award of compensation at Rs 5 lakhs can be attributed to be the resultant effect of either emotions or sentiments or the High Court's anguish over the incident. The High Court obviously considered the overall situation as regards social placement of the students. As stated hereinafter the School presently is one of the affluent schools in the country and the fee structure and other incidentals are so high that it would be a well-nigh impossibility to think of admission in the School at even the upper middle class level. Obviously the School caters to the need of the upper strata of the society and if the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act can be termed to be any guide, the compensation could have been a much larger sum. Thus in the factual situation, award of compensation at Rs 5 lakhs cannot by any stretch be termed to be excessive. Another redeeming feature of Mr Bahuguna's submissions pertains to the theory of ability to pay: audited accounts have been produced for the year 1995 depicting a situation, though not of having stringency but the situation truly cannot but be ascribed to be otherwise comfortable to pay as directed by the High Court. The matter, however, was prolonged in the law courts in the usual manner and it took nearly six years for its final disposal before this Court — these six years, however, had rendered the financial stability of the School concerned in a much more stronger situation than what it was in the year 1995. The School as of date stands out to be one of the most affluent schools in the country, as such ability to pay cannot be termed to be an issue in the matter and in the wake thereto we are not inclined to deal with the same in any further detail.”
12. At this stage, we may usefully notice the judgment in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Company Limited (2010) 10 SCC 254. In that case, a two-Judge Bench considered the issue relating to award of compensation to the appellant who had suffered grievous injuries in a road accident. At the time of the accident, the appellant’s age was 25 years and he was a student of Bachelor of Engineering (Mechanical). The Tribunal had awarded compensation of Rs.2,50,000. The High Court enhanced it to Rs.3,50,000. After noticing the judgments in G.M., Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas (supra) and Sarla Verma v. DTC (supra), the Bench enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs.9,06,000. The reasons for this approach are discernible from paragraphs 13 to 15 of the judgment, which are extracted below:
â€Å“13. The appellant at the time of accident was a final year Engineering (Mechanical) student in a reputed college. He was a remarkably brilliant student having passed all his semester examinations in distinction. Due to the said accident he suffered grievous injuries and remained in coma for about two months. His studies got interrupted as he was moved to different hospitals for surgeries and other treatments. For many months his condition remained serious; his right hand was amputated and vision seriously affected. These multiple injuries ultimately led to 70% permanent disablement. He has been rendered incapacitated and a career ahead of him in his chosen line of Mechanical Engineering got dashed for ever. He is now in a physical condition that he requires domestic help throughout his life. He has been deprived of pecuniary benefits which he could have reasonably acquired had he not suffered permanent disablement to the extent of 70% in the accident.
14. On completion of Bachelor of Engineering (Mechanical) from the prestigious institute like BIT, it can be reasonably assumed that he would have got a good job. The appellant has stated in his evidence that in the campus interview he was selected by Tata as well as Reliance Industries and was offered pay package of Rs. 3,50,000 per annum. Even if that is not accepted for want of any evidence in support thereof, there would not have been any difficulty for him in getting some decent job in the private sector. Had he decided to join government service and got selected, he would have been put in the pay scale for Assistant Engineer and would have at least earned Rs. 60,000 per annum.
Wherever he joined, he had a fair chance of some promotion and remote chance of some high position. But uncertainties of life cannot be ignored taking relevant factors into consideration. In our opinion, it is fair and reasonable to assess his future earnings at Rs. 60,000 per annum taking the salary and allowances payable to an Assistant Engineer in public employment as the basis. Since he suffered 70% permanent disability, the future earnings may be discounted by 30% and, accordingly, we estimate upon the facts that the multiplicand should be Rs.
42,000 per annum.
15. The appellant at the time of accident was about 25 years.
As per the decision of this Court in Sarla Verma v. DTC the operative multiplier would be 18. The loss of future earnings by multiplying the multiplicand of Rs. 42,000 by a multiplier of 18 comes to Rs. 7,56,000. The damages to compensate the appellant towards loss of future earnings, in our considered judgment, must be Rs. 7,56,000. The Tribunal awarded him Rs. 1,50,000 towards treatment including the medical expenses. The same is maintained as it is and, accordingly, the total amount of compensation to which the appellant is entitled is Rs.
9,06,000.”
13. In Lata Wadhwa̢۪s case, the accident had occurred on 03.03.1989 and this Court awarded compensation of Rs.4,10,000 to the parents of the deceased children who were students of Classes VI to X. In M.S. Grewal̢۪s case, the accident had occurred on 28.5.1995. This Court awarded compensation of Rs.5,00,000 to the parents of the children who were students of IV, V and VI classes. In Anil Kumar Mishra̢۪s case, the accident had occurred on 23.6.1993 and the victim of accident, who was a student of final year Engineering was awarded compensation of Rs.9,06,000.
14. In the present case, the accident occurred on 20.1.2003. The deceased was 19 years old and was a student of Engineering course. The Tribunal determined the compensation by taking his annual income to be Rs.15,000 and deducted 1/3rd towards personal expenses. In Arvind Kumar Mishra̢۪s case, the Bench proceeded on the assumption that after completion of the Engineering course, the appellant could have been appointed as Assistant Engineer and earn Rs.60,000 per annum. However, keeping in view the degree of disability, his estimated earning was taken as Rs.42,000 per annum and accordingly the amount of compensation was awarded. By applying the same yardstick and having regard to the age of the parents of the deceased, i.e., 45 and 42 respectively, we feel that ends of justice will be served by awarding a lump sum compensation of Rs.7,00,000 to the appellants.
15. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The impugned judgment is modified and it is declared that the appellants shall be entitled to compensation of Rs.7,00,000 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the enhanced amount with effect from the date of filing petition under Section 166 of the Act.
16. Respondent No.3 is directed to pay the amount of enhanced compensation and interest within a period of three months by getting prepared two demand drafts of equal amount in the names of appellant Nos.1 and 2. It will be open to respondent No.3 to recover from respondent Nos.1 and 2 their respective shares of the compensation.

[G.S. SINGHVI] New Delhi, ..J.